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Nearly two years into his presidency, President Prabowo Subianto has moved decisively to tighten his grip on Indonesia’s two most powerful security institutions. A series of leadership changes at the National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian Military (TNI) this month have systematically reduced the residual influence of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration, realigning internal loyalties and strengthening presidential authority for the remainder of his term toward the 2029 elections.
The most immediate and sweeping action focused on the police force. On Oct. 1, Prabowo inaugurated Gen. Suyudi Ario Seto as the new police chief, replacing Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, who had held the post since 2021 under the previous administration. The appointment of the former National Narcotics Agency head received rapid legislative approval and Suyudi was sworn in the same day alongside a new deputy, Wahyu Hadiningrat. Within 24 hours, Suyudi launched the first of three major personnel reshuffles.
On Oct. 2, he moved 88 senior and mid-ranking officers, 70 of whom received promotions or new posts. This included 14 key positions at the National Police headquarters, among them the supervision inspector general, the intelligence and security head, the criminal investigation head and the security maintenance head. In addition, 19 regional police chiefs were appointed, including the critical post of Jakarta Police chief. The second wave on Oct. 10 shifted another 199 officers, and the third on Oct. 12 adjusted 12 more. In total, nearly 300 officers were reassigned in the first two weeks, placing Prabowo-aligned figures in the force’s most strategic operational and territorial posts.
The TNI requires a more measured approach, and Prabowo has not yet replaced the current chief, Jokowi appointee Gen. Agus Subiyanto. As a former Army general himself, Prabowo understands the value of observing institutional procedures and traditional promotion pathways even while exercising his constitutional authority.
On Oct. 15, he orchestrated a carefully sequenced swap at the top of the Army hierarchy: Gen. Maruli Simanjuntak was appointed TNI deputy commander and concurrent head of the National Border and Remote Area Management Agency (BNPPDT). Maruli’s previous post as Army chief of staff was filled by former deputy commander Gen. Tandyo Budi Revita. In addition, several senior military officers were moved into strategic civilian-linked roles, including deputy defense minister.
Traditionally, being appointed Army chief of staff has been the most common pathway to becoming TNI commander. By repositioning these figures, Prabowo is shaping the succession pool while respecting existing mechanisms. Both Agus and Maruli are Jokowi-era appointees, so their eventual replacement is widely regarded as a matter of time.
The TNI and the National Police operate through deep patronage systems in which career advancement, postings and access to resources generate both personal and institutional loyalty. Until recently, the upper echelons of the two institutions were dominated by officers whose rose under Jokowi. The changes earlier this month systematically insert officers whose networks and careers align more closely with Prabowo.
Both institutions are powerful political actors capable of leveraging their territorial presence, coercive capacity and information networks against any sitting president; therefore, full reconfiguration of their leadership has required patience. Prabowo took roughly two years to reach this stage, by first consolidating broader governing coalitions and expanding military roles in civilian programs, and then moving on the police and army hierarchies. Residual Jokowi influence had persisted through senior security roles: The recent reshuffles and the anticipated TNI chief succession are designed to dismantle that leverage.
It is almost certain that Prabowo will give the top military post to an Army figure, ignoring an unwritten convention that the three military services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, take turns. While it should really be the Air Force’s turn, this convention has been broken many times in the past to favor the Army, the largest and most powerful of the three.
Once Prabowo installs a new TNI chief, he will exercise comprehensive operational and political command over both security institutions, and loyalty will no longer be filtered through holdover networks. This consolidated control strengthens governance capacity for the remaining three years of his term and creates a more reliable institutional foundation for the 2029 electoral cycle and beyond, reducing the risk that security sector actors could function as independent power centers or become leverage points for rival political forces.
In short, the October 2026 changes, swift and extensive at the National Police and preparatory and sequential at the TNI, represent a methodical consolidation of presidential authority over the country’s primary instruments of coercion and territorial control. By combining constitutional power with respect for institutional procedure and by systematically realigning patronage networks, Prabowo is converting formal authority into practical loyalty that serves both immediate governance needs and longer-term political continuity.
