Sector

Mining

Indonesia, a country rich in natural resources, boasts a mining sector that is undeniably one of its leading sectors. With vast reserves of mineral and non-mineral mining resources, the country stands as a global powerhouse in the mining industry. As of 2022, Indonesia’s mining industry contributed Rp2.3 quadrillion to the national GDP, accounting for 12.22 percent.

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Mining

Indonesia, a country rich in natural resources, boasts a mining sector that is undeniably one of its leading sectors. With vast reserves of mineral and non-mineral mining resources, the country stands as a global powerhouse in the mining industry. As of 2022, Indonesia’s mining industry contributed Rp2.3 quadrillion to the national GDP, accounting for 12.22 percent.

Mining flourishes across various regions of the country, each contributing to the nation’s economy. It is present in regions such as South Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands, Bangka-Belitung, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and North Kalimantan. Additionally, mining is also prevalent in Southeast Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua.

Indonesia’s wealth of mineral resources offers a wide variety of materials available for mining. From abundant reserves of gold, bauxite, tin, and copper concentrates to nickel ore, the country’s rich mineral resources signify significant potential for economic growth and development. In addition, Indonesia is also rich in coal mining, with its abundant coal reserves catering to the energy needs of both domestic and international markets.

The country's mining sector thrives on these resources. In 2023, mineral resources such as bauxite reached a production of 28 million tons, gold at 85 thousand kilograms, tin concentrate at 57 thousand metric tons, copper concentrate at 3 million metric tons, along with nickel ore at 98 million metric tons.3 Meanwhile, Indonesia’s coal production reached 775.2 million tons in 2023, almost double than ten years earlier when coal production stood at 421 million tons.

Additionally, Indonesia is home to oil and gas exploration and exploitation, although its output has been dwindling. Once an exporting country of oil and gas, Indonesia has transitioned into a net importer of these commodities since 2008 when consumption surpassed outputs, which stood at around 1 million barrels per day (bpd). In the first semester of 2023, Indonesia’s oil output stood at 615 bpd.

Subsequently, the government has worked hard to reverse the trend of falling oil output and has set a target to restore oil lifting to 1 million bpd in 2030, alongside a gas production target of 12 billion standard cubic feet per day (BSCFD). As of January 2023, Indonesia’s documented oil reserves were 2.41 billion barrels, and its natural gas reserves stood at 35.5 trillion cubic feet.

As for investments, Indonesia secured US$30.3 billion for the energy and mining sector in 2023, marking an 11 percent increase from the previous year. That same year, the oil and gas sector led the way,

achieving US$15.6 billion in investments, followed by mineral and coal at US$7.46 billion, electricity at US$5.8 billion, and renewable energy at US$1.5 billion.

Latest News

October 13, 2026

The latest ruling by the Constitutional Court has raised far more questions than it has answered regarding the educational qualifications of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

In a decision handed down on Oct. 6, the court noted it found no convincing evidence that Gibran possessed a foreign diploma, certificate or other credential that could legitimately serve as the foundation for an Indonesian senior high school equivalency certificate. Yet the court stopped short of annulling Gibran’s candidacy or removing him from office as the petitioners demanded.

In October 2023, the court cleared the path for the eldest son of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, then aged 36, to run for vice president the 2024 general election by ruling that the age of candidacy, set at a minimum 40 years, could be bypassed by individuals who had held an elected regional post. That controversial decision, issued by a bench led by Gibran’s uncle by marriage Anwar Usman, was followed nine days later by Gibran registering as Prabowo Subianto’s running mate. Anwar was subsequently removed as chief justice by the court's ethics council over a severe breach regarding conflict of interest.

The court determined that the petitioners lacked legal standing, precluding a hearing on the petition's merits. It further ruled that Gibran could not be unseated through an election dispute because he ceased to be a candidate the moment he was inaugurated in October 2024. Questions regarding preelection eligibility, the bench reiterated, fell under the purview of other state bodies.

The outcome ensures that this decision alone does not invalidate Gibran’s mandate. However, the legal challenge served an equally potent purpose: laying bare institutional vulnerabilities in the country’s electoral architecture. The Constitutional Court has effectively become a public forum where systemic flaws in election administration are dragged into daylight, even when it lacks the authority to correct them.

Here, the proceedings have cast serious doubt on whether the state properly enforced the most fundamental constitutional and legal requirements for an executive office. That burden of accountability now falls squarely on the General Elections Commission (KPU), the body responsible for vetting Gibran’s eligibility in the first place.

The commission maintains that it complied with existing regulations by referring to a 2019 Education and Culture Ministry certificate recognizing Gibran’s overseas schooling, alongside an accompanying decree from the ministry’s Directorate General of Higher Education. But the court’s observations reveal a glaring chasm between administrative rubber-stamping and substantive verification. As the court underscored, the administrative presumption of validity (vermoeden van rechtmatigheid) must always be grounded in accuracy and due prudence. The ruling starkly illuminated the KPU’s failure to conduct factual verification of the actual educational records underlying the ministry's certification.

This is where the issue transcends Gibran’s individual case. Election administrators are not mere paper collectors. Their core constitutional duty is to ensure that candidates meet every threshold demanded by law. When a fundamental qualification clears the vetting pipeline without its underlying documentary proof ever being verified, the credibility of the entire electoral system is compromised. Formal administrative compliance cannot serve as an excuse for failing to conduct basic due diligence on baseline qualifications. Inevitably, the controversy threatens to further erode public trust in the KPU’s capacity to oversee clean and fair elections.

The immediate question is where accountability goes from here. The House of Representatives presents one avenue. Lawmaker Deddy Sitorus from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has indicated the legislature could pursue the matter through a special committee (Pansus) or formally invoke its right of inquiry. Other factions remain noncommittal. House Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who hails from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, said while the House respected the court’s ruling, the legislature had yet to weigh in on its broader political and legal fallout.

Any legislative push, however, should not be conflated with imminent dismissal. Under Article 7B of the 1945 Constitution, unseating an incumbent president or vice president requires an onerous, multitiered process demanding the endorsement of a House plenary session, adjudication by the Constitutional Court and a final vote before the People’s Consultative Assembly.

The immediate priority is not constitutional crisis but institutional transparency. The court has delineated the limits of its authority; the test now is whether the institutions that do hold jurisdiction have the will to examine what took place before Gibran appeared on the ballot. For the KPU, that requires explaining precisely how his secondary education credentials were confirmed and demonstrating whether its vetting process met legal rigor. For the House, it means determining whether the court's revelations justify formal oversight of electoral governance and the integrity of the agencies involved.

Finally, this episode exposes a structural blind spot: A legal framework full of intricate vetting mechanisms can still prove powerless when credible eligibility disputes surface only after an official has assumed one of the highest offices in the land. The Constitutional Court’s ruling may have shut down a specific legal avenue, but it has not answered how the electoral machinery enabled the circumstances that gave rise to such a dispute in the first place. Whether the KPU and the House confront that institutional lapse or allow basic constitutional thresholds to slide will determine how much credibility remains in the vetting of the nation’s leaders.

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