Sector
Tourism
Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
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Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
Indonesia has identified 10 priority tourism destinations, including Borobudur, Mandalika, Labuan Bajo, Bromo Tengger Semeru, Thousand Islands, Lake Toba, Wakatobi, Tanjung Lesung, Morotai, and Tanjung Kelayang. Both domestic and international tourists constitute the country’s tourism market potential. In 2023, the number of foreign tourist visits reached 11.68 million, with the largest contributions coming from Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, China, and East Timor. This increase in visits also corresponds with the growth of tourism foreign exchange earnings, which reached US$6.08 billion in the first semester of 2023.
Major provinces attracting international tourists include Bali, DKI Jakarta, Riau Islands, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java. Meanwhile, the number of domestic tourist trips in 2023 reached 749,114,709 trips, with DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, and East Java having the highest travel ratios.
Aside from the tourism sector, Indonesia’s creative economy sector has also shown significant growth, with exports reaching US$11.82 billion in the first half of 2023. The fashion subsector is the main contributor with US$6.56 billion (55.52 percent), followed by culinary products with US$4.46 billion (37.70 percent), and crafts with US$792.67 million (6.71 percent).
Moreover, the sector has realized US$225.28 million in foreign direct investment (FDI) and US$577.87 million in domestic direct investment (DDI) in the first quarter of 2023 out of the sector’s total target investment of US$2.68 billion in 2022. The Tourism and Creative Economy Ministry targets investment in this sector to reach US$6-8 billion, with the hope of creating 4.4 million new jobs in 2024. This investment fund is planned to be allocated for the development of five-star hotel accommodations in super-priority tourism destination areas (DPSP) and 10 other priority tourism destinations.
Meanwhile, realized investments in the tourism sector in 2022 amounted to US$2.33 billion. Furthermore, FDI also contributes significantly, especially reaching Rp8.7 trillion from Singapore amounting to Rp2.458 billion, followed by Hong Kong with Rp1.720 billion, and India with Rp1.385 billion.
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Nearly two years into his presidency, President Prabowo Subianto has moved decisively to tighten his grip on Indonesia’s two most powerful security institutions. A series of leadership changes at the National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian Military (TNI) this month have systematically reduced the residual influence of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration, realigning internal loyalties and strengthening presidential authority for the remainder of his term toward the 2029 elections.
The most immediate and sweeping action focused on the police force. On Oct. 1, Prabowo inaugurated Gen. Suyudi Ario Seto as the new police chief, replacing Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, who had held the post since 2021 under the previous administration. The appointment of the former National Narcotics Agency head received rapid legislative approval and Suyudi was sworn in the same day alongside a new deputy, Wahyu Hadiningrat. Within 24 hours, Suyudi launched the first of three major personnel reshuffles.
On Oct. 2, he moved 88 senior and mid-ranking officers, 70 of whom received promotions or new posts. This included 14 key positions at the National Police headquarters, among them the supervision inspector general, the intelligence and security head, the criminal investigation head and the security maintenance head. In addition, 19 regional police chiefs were appointed, including the critical post of Jakarta Police chief. The second wave on Oct. 10 shifted another 199 officers, and the third on Oct. 12 adjusted 12 more. In total, nearly 300 officers were reassigned in the first two weeks, placing Prabowo-aligned figures in the force’s most strategic operational and territorial posts.
The TNI requires a more measured approach, and Prabowo has not yet replaced the current chief, Jokowi appointee Gen. Agus Subiyanto. As a former Army general himself, Prabowo understands the value of observing institutional procedures and traditional promotion pathways even while exercising his constitutional authority.
On Oct. 15, he orchestrated a carefully sequenced swap at the top of the Army hierarchy: Gen. Maruli Simanjuntak was appointed TNI deputy commander and concurrent head of the National Border and Remote Area Management Agency (BNPPDT). Maruli’s previous post as Army chief of staff was filled by former deputy commander Gen. Tandyo Budi Revita. In addition, several senior military officers were moved into strategic civilian-linked roles, including deputy defense minister.
Traditionally, being appointed Army chief of staff has been the most common pathway to becoming TNI commander. By repositioning these figures, Prabowo is shaping the succession pool while respecting existing mechanisms. Both Agus and Maruli are Jokowi-era appointees, so their eventual replacement is widely regarded as a matter of time.
The TNI and the National Police operate through deep patronage systems in which career advancement, postings and access to resources generate both personal and institutional loyalty. Until recently, the upper echelons of the two institutions were dominated by officers whose rose under Jokowi. The changes earlier this month systematically insert officers whose networks and careers align more closely with Prabowo.
Both institutions are powerful political actors capable of leveraging their territorial presence, coercive capacity and information networks against any sitting president; therefore, full reconfiguration of their leadership has required patience. Prabowo took roughly two years to reach this stage, by first consolidating broader governing coalitions and expanding military roles in civilian programs, and then moving on the police and army hierarchies. Residual Jokowi influence had persisted through senior security roles: The recent reshuffles and the anticipated TNI chief succession are designed to dismantle that leverage.
It is almost certain that Prabowo will give the top military post to an Army figure, ignoring an unwritten convention that the three military services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, take turns. While it should really be the Air Force’s turn, this convention has been broken many times in the past to favor the Army, the largest and most powerful of the three.
Once Prabowo installs a new TNI chief, he will exercise comprehensive operational and political command over both security institutions, and loyalty will no longer be filtered through holdover networks. This consolidated control strengthens governance capacity for the remaining three years of his term and creates a more reliable institutional foundation for the 2029 electoral cycle and beyond, reducing the risk that security sector actors could function as independent power centers or become leverage points for rival political forces.
In short, the October 2026 changes, swift and extensive at the National Police and preparatory and sequential at the TNI, represent a methodical consolidation of presidential authority over the country’s primary instruments of coercion and territorial control. By combining constitutional power with respect for institutional procedure and by systematically realigning patronage networks, Prabowo is converting formal authority into practical loyalty that serves both immediate governance needs and longer-term political continuity.
