Sector
Tourism
Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
View moreTourism
Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
Indonesia has identified 10 priority tourism destinations, including Borobudur, Mandalika, Labuan Bajo, Bromo Tengger Semeru, Thousand Islands, Lake Toba, Wakatobi, Tanjung Lesung, Morotai, and Tanjung Kelayang. Both domestic and international tourists constitute the country’s tourism market potential. In 2023, the number of foreign tourist visits reached 11.68 million, with the largest contributions coming from Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, China, and East Timor. This increase in visits also corresponds with the growth of tourism foreign exchange earnings, which reached US$6.08 billion in the first semester of 2023.
Major provinces attracting international tourists include Bali, DKI Jakarta, Riau Islands, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java. Meanwhile, the number of domestic tourist trips in 2023 reached 749,114,709 trips, with DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, and East Java having the highest travel ratios.
Aside from the tourism sector, Indonesia’s creative economy sector has also shown significant growth, with exports reaching US$11.82 billion in the first half of 2023. The fashion subsector is the main contributor with US$6.56 billion (55.52 percent), followed by culinary products with US$4.46 billion (37.70 percent), and crafts with US$792.67 million (6.71 percent).
Moreover, the sector has realized US$225.28 million in foreign direct investment (FDI) and US$577.87 million in domestic direct investment (DDI) in the first quarter of 2023 out of the sector’s total target investment of US$2.68 billion in 2022. The Tourism and Creative Economy Ministry targets investment in this sector to reach US$6-8 billion, with the hope of creating 4.4 million new jobs in 2024. This investment fund is planned to be allocated for the development of five-star hotel accommodations in super-priority tourism destination areas (DPSP) and 10 other priority tourism destinations.
Meanwhile, realized investments in the tourism sector in 2022 amounted to US$2.33 billion. Furthermore, FDI also contributes significantly, especially reaching Rp8.7 trillion from Singapore amounting to Rp2.458 billion, followed by Hong Kong with Rp1.720 billion, and India with Rp1.385 billion.
Latest News
The latest ruling by the Constitutional Court has raised far more questions than it has answered regarding the educational qualifications of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.
In a decision handed down on Oct. 6, the court noted it found no convincing evidence that Gibran possessed a foreign diploma, certificate or other credential that could legitimately serve as the foundation for an Indonesian senior high school equivalency certificate. Yet the court stopped short of annulling Gibran’s candidacy or removing him from office as the petitioners demanded.
In October 2023, the court cleared the path for the eldest son of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, then aged 36, to run for vice president the 2024 general election by ruling that the age of candidacy, set at a minimum 40 years, could be bypassed by individuals who had held an elected regional post. That controversial decision, issued by a bench led by Gibran’s uncle by marriage Anwar Usman, was followed nine days later by Gibran registering as Prabowo Subianto’s running mate. Anwar was subsequently removed as chief justice by the court's ethics council over a severe breach regarding conflict of interest.
The court determined that the petitioners lacked legal standing, precluding a hearing on the petition's merits. It further ruled that Gibran could not be unseated through an election dispute because he ceased to be a candidate the moment he was inaugurated in October 2024. Questions regarding preelection eligibility, the bench reiterated, fell under the purview of other state bodies.
The outcome ensures that this decision alone does not invalidate Gibran’s mandate. However, the legal challenge served an equally potent purpose: laying bare institutional vulnerabilities in the country’s electoral architecture. The Constitutional Court has effectively become a public forum where systemic flaws in election administration are dragged into daylight, even when it lacks the authority to correct them.
Here, the proceedings have cast serious doubt on whether the state properly enforced the most fundamental constitutional and legal requirements for an executive office. That burden of accountability now falls squarely on the General Elections Commission (KPU), the body responsible for vetting Gibran’s eligibility in the first place.
The commission maintains that it complied with existing regulations by referring to a 2019 Education and Culture Ministry certificate recognizing Gibran’s overseas schooling, alongside an accompanying decree from the ministry’s Directorate General of Higher Education. But the court’s observations reveal a glaring chasm between administrative rubber-stamping and substantive verification. As the court underscored, the administrative presumption of validity (vermoeden van rechtmatigheid) must always be grounded in accuracy and due prudence. The ruling starkly illuminated the KPU’s failure to conduct factual verification of the actual educational records underlying the ministry's certification.
This is where the issue transcends Gibran’s individual case. Election administrators are not mere paper collectors. Their core constitutional duty is to ensure that candidates meet every threshold demanded by law. When a fundamental qualification clears the vetting pipeline without its underlying documentary proof ever being verified, the credibility of the entire electoral system is compromised. Formal administrative compliance cannot serve as an excuse for failing to conduct basic due diligence on baseline qualifications. Inevitably, the controversy threatens to further erode public trust in the KPU’s capacity to oversee clean and fair elections.
The immediate question is where accountability goes from here. The House of Representatives presents one avenue. Lawmaker Deddy Sitorus from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has indicated the legislature could pursue the matter through a special committee (Pansus) or formally invoke its right of inquiry. Other factions remain noncommittal. House Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who hails from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, said while the House respected the court’s ruling, the legislature had yet to weigh in on its broader political and legal fallout.
Any legislative push, however, should not be conflated with imminent dismissal. Under Article 7B of the 1945 Constitution, unseating an incumbent president or vice president requires an onerous, multitiered process demanding the endorsement of a House plenary session, adjudication by the Constitutional Court and a final vote before the People’s Consultative Assembly.
The immediate priority is not constitutional crisis but institutional transparency. The court has delineated the limits of its authority; the test now is whether the institutions that do hold jurisdiction have the will to examine what took place before Gibran appeared on the ballot. For the KPU, that requires explaining precisely how his secondary education credentials were confirmed and demonstrating whether its vetting process met legal rigor. For the House, it means determining whether the court's revelations justify formal oversight of electoral governance and the integrity of the agencies involved.
Finally, this episode exposes a structural blind spot: A legal framework full of intricate vetting mechanisms can still prove powerless when credible eligibility disputes surface only after an official has assumed one of the highest offices in the land. The Constitutional Court’s ruling may have shut down a specific legal avenue, but it has not answered how the electoral machinery enabled the circumstances that gave rise to such a dispute in the first place. Whether the KPU and the House confront that institutional lapse or allow basic constitutional thresholds to slide will determine how much credibility remains in the vetting of the nation’s leaders.
