Sector
Tourism
Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
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Indonesia has designated tourism as a primary sector with a strong commitment to integrated infrastructure development and the enhancement of skilled and quality human resources. In 2023, the realization of investment in the tourism sector was predominantly driven by domestic investment (PMDN), reaching Rp 14.9 trillion. The PMDN funds were allocated to various types of businesses, including Rp 8.228 billion for star-rated hotels in West Nusa Tenggara, Rp2.601 billion for tourism areas in DKI Jakarta, and Rp1.656 billion for restaurants in Bali.
Indonesia has identified 10 priority tourism destinations, including Borobudur, Mandalika, Labuan Bajo, Bromo Tengger Semeru, Thousand Islands, Lake Toba, Wakatobi, Tanjung Lesung, Morotai, and Tanjung Kelayang. Both domestic and international tourists constitute the country’s tourism market potential. In 2023, the number of foreign tourist visits reached 11.68 million, with the largest contributions coming from Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, China, and East Timor. This increase in visits also corresponds with the growth of tourism foreign exchange earnings, which reached US$6.08 billion in the first semester of 2023.
Major provinces attracting international tourists include Bali, DKI Jakarta, Riau Islands, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Java. Meanwhile, the number of domestic tourist trips in 2023 reached 749,114,709 trips, with DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, and East Java having the highest travel ratios.
Aside from the tourism sector, Indonesia’s creative economy sector has also shown significant growth, with exports reaching US$11.82 billion in the first half of 2023. The fashion subsector is the main contributor with US$6.56 billion (55.52 percent), followed by culinary products with US$4.46 billion (37.70 percent), and crafts with US$792.67 million (6.71 percent).
Moreover, the sector has realized US$225.28 million in foreign direct investment (FDI) and US$577.87 million in domestic direct investment (DDI) in the first quarter of 2023 out of the sector’s total target investment of US$2.68 billion in 2022. The Tourism and Creative Economy Ministry targets investment in this sector to reach US$6-8 billion, with the hope of creating 4.4 million new jobs in 2024. This investment fund is planned to be allocated for the development of five-star hotel accommodations in super-priority tourism destination areas (DPSP) and 10 other priority tourism destinations.
Meanwhile, realized investments in the tourism sector in 2022 amounted to US$2.33 billion. Furthermore, FDI also contributes significantly, especially reaching Rp8.7 trillion from Singapore amounting to Rp2.458 billion, followed by Hong Kong with Rp1.720 billion, and India with Rp1.385 billion.
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As toxic haze from seasonal forest and peatland fires blanketed swaths of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua, a second crisis unfolded online: Content creators, civil society organizations, environmental activists and regional officials reported a sudden wave of digital suppression.
Eyewitness footage of burning peatlands was flagged as sensitive, awareness campaigns were down-ranked and high-visibility posts were abruptly removed, among them a viral video by Siak Regent Afni Zulkifli documenting postfire reforestation efforts. When netizens accused the government of state-sponsored censorship, Communications and Digital Minister Meutya Hafid issued a firm denial. The ministry had not submitted any takedown orders for forest fire content to social media platforms, she said, stressing that real-time public reporting was vital for emergency response.
That raised an obvious question: If the state was not behind the suppression, who was responsible?
The answer points to major platforms such as Meta, TikTok and X, whose silence obscures a broader legal and structural shift. Under a 2020 ministerial regulation and subsequent compliance directives, the government has effectively outsourced moderation to private companies. Platforms can be penalized for failing to police “prohibited content” and content deemed to cause “public unrest”, which has pushed them to act preemptively as censors through opaque algorithmic suppression and protect themselves from potential sanctions.
Netizens and public figures noticed that posts raising awareness about haze and forest destruction immediately suffered severe drops in reach. Activist accounts were suspended and videos documenting environmental rehabilitation were removed under vague terms of service provisions.
Despite the public outcry, the platforms stayed silent. They offered no explanations to affected creators, nor did they say whether automated filters had misclassified disaster reporting. That silence may serve a corporate strategy: By presenting mass content removal as routine terms of service enforcement, platforms limit their exposure to local liabilities and avoid friction with host governments.
Under the 2020 regulation, foreign and domestic private electronic system operators (PSE) face strict compliance rules. Standard takedown requests must be actioned within 24 hours, while content deemed a threat to public safety, public order or national security must be taken down within just four. The definition for “prohibited content” is broad and ambiguous, covering material deemed to cause “public anxiety” or disturb “public order”. Noncompliance can bring heavy fines, operational sanctions and a nationwide block.
These penalties reshape platforms’ risk calculations. With so much at stake commercially, a wait and see approach is too costly, so platforms have a strong incentive to calibrate their automated systems toward over-removal.
Meutya’s statement that the ministry had not requested any takedowns may well be true, but it misses how modern digital governance works. The state no longer needs to issue a notice for every sensitive post. Through regulatory design, it has created structural incentives that encourage platforms to demote or remove viral posts depicting environmental crises, toxic haze and public panic before they attract official scrutiny.
The collateral damage is significant. Language models and computer vision often struggle with local context. When millions of users simultaneously post footage of orange skies and dense smoke, algorithms can misread it as graphic violence, distressing content or coordinated spam and trigger automatic down-ranking or removal. By shifting the burden of proactive moderation onto private companies, the state retains plausible deniability. It can publicly champion open information while platform algorithms quietly contain crisis reporting.
The incident exposes a dangerous vulnerability in public discourse. In a disaster, social media is vital infrastructure for public safety, resource coordination and community accountability. When regulation compels platforms to act as private police under the threat of bans, free expression and public awareness quietly erode. Resolving this requires moving beyond simply framing the issue as state versus user and toward systemic platform accountability.
Until technology companies are required to disclose their moderation rules, audit their crisis response algorithms and resist overreaching compliance demands, the public will remain caught between state regulatory pressure and silent corporate censorship.
