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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.
Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.
Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.
Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.
In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.
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The controversy over military-style training for candidate managers of the Red and White Cooperatives and Fisherman’s Villages programs points to something larger than a single policy failure: the steady expansion of the Indonesian Military (TNI) into civilian governance and economic management. While the deaths of five civilian trainees has sparked public alarm, the deeper concern is how state institutions are being reshaped around military discipline and authority.
The cooperatives program aims to build roughly 80,000 cooperatives nationwide to boost rural economies, distribute subsidized goods and support a target of 8 percent economic growth by 2029. To manage this vast network, around 35,000 prospective managers were required to complete 45 days of military-led training at TNI facilities.
Officials describe the training as necessary for building discipline, leadership and shared national values among future managers. But relying on military institutions for this purpose raises real questions about institutional boundaries and whether military methods belong in economic management.
These concerns intensified after five trainees died within the program's first 10 days, from causes including cardiac arrest, heat stroke, tuberculosis and pneumonia. Rather than suspending the program, the government reviewed it, scaled back its physical intensity and dropped some military elements like shooting exercises, while keeping the program running. This response signals a high tolerance for operational risk and suggests the initiative carries significant political weight, raising concerns for investors about governance standards and crisis management in state-led programs.
The training's content has also drawn scrutiny. Though officially framed as character-building, it includes nationalism, discipline and ideological instruction resembling military reserve training. Critics argue this amounts to indoctrination rather than practical skill-building. Despite government denials that the program is militaristic, heavy involvement from the Defense Ministry and TNI personnel reinforces the perception that civilian economic actors are being molded within a military framework.
This fits into the broader context of the Reserves Component (Komcad) program, under which civilians, including civil servants, receive basic military training and can be mobilized during national emergencies. In 2026, thousands of state civil apparatus personnel joined this reserve system after training designed to instill nationalism and discipline. Though officially framed around national defense, such programs raise concerns about dual-use capabilities, blurring the line between civilian roles and military readiness.
The cooperatives program carries its own economic risks independent of the militarization issue. At an estimated cost of around Rp 400 trillion (US$25 billion), analysts warn of fiscal strain and the risk of villages falling into debt cycles. Cooperatives have a history of vulnerability to mismanagement and corruption, and well-funded, state-backed cooperatives could crowd out the small businesses that sustain local rural economies.
What sets this controversy apart is its place within a wider pattern of military expansion into civilian life under President Prabowo Subianto, himself a retired Army general. The TNI's role has grown to include agriculture, food security and public service delivery, entire battalions have been assigned to farming initiatives, and the Army has developed agroforestry programs with local governments and state enterprises. These efforts position the military as a development "enabler," but they also shift the balance between civilian and military institutions in ways that could affect accountability and efficiency.
The cooperative training program is part of this same trajectory. By placing future economic managers under military supervision, replicated across tens of thousands of villages, it builds a dense network of military presence at the grassroots level, one that, even unintentionally, could function like a system of observation and control.
The business implications are wide-ranging: politically, this may signal a retreat from the post-Reform principle of civil-military separation; operationally, blending military and economic functions can muddy decision-making and reduce transparency; reputationally, companies operating alongside such programs may face scrutiny over governance and human rights concerns.
The five trainee deaths are a tragedy in their own right, but they also expose deeper tensions in Indonesia's institutional landscape. Though the government has eased the training's intensity, it has not questioned the underlying premise of military involvement. The real risk for businesses is not the training program itself, but the broader shift it represents, toward a governance model where military influence becomes normalized within the civilian economy, with uncertain consequences for transparency and market stability.
