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Finance

Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.

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Finance

Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.

With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.

Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.

Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.

Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.

In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.

Latest News

September 17, 2026

Indonesia’s recurring wildfires have once again spiraled into a crisis that reaches far beyond its forests and peatlands. As dense haze shuts down schools, endangers public health, and chokes local economies at home, smoke from fires across Sumatra and Kalimantan has drifted across national borders, blanketing parts of Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. What has long been treated as an unfortunate, seasonal environmental headache is morphing into a thorny test of governance, and an escalating diplomatic liability for Jakarta.

The scale of this year’s burn is staggering. Data from Nusantara Atlas shows a dramatic surge in cumulative hotspots in late August, leaping from 190,571 on Aug. 22 to 294,699 just a day later. By Sept. 10, that tally had topped 301,990, with Kalimantan recording the highest density of active blazes. The emissions tell an equally grim story. According to the European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service, Indonesia’s wildfires released an estimated 19.7 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide between Sept. 1 and 7 alone, accounting for more than a third of all wildfire emissions worldwide during that period.

By July, roughly 202,000 hectares had already burned, according to data cited by Reuters. That damage expanded sharply through August, with total burned area estimated to have reached 600,000 ha, concentrated largely in Kalimantan, Sumatra, and South Papua. A potent El Niño has undoubtedly exacerbated conditions, ushering in parched, blistering weather that allows fires to ignite and spread with ease. Yet weather alone cannot shoulder the blame for a disaster that returns like clockwork.

Forestry Minister Raja Juli Antoni has openly acknowledged that many of these fires were set intentionally by individuals and corporations. Slashing and burning remains the cheapest, easiest method for clearing land in rural Indonesia, particularly where peatlands and native forests are systematically converted into oil palm and pulp plantations. This reality shifts the underlying debate: The issue is not simply whether Indonesia can respond to extreme weather, but whether it possesses the political will to stop illegal burning and hold perpetrators accountable.

Authorities have started taking legal steps. The Forestry Ministry recently handed down administrative sanctions to six Forest Utilization Business Permit holders after fires scorched 1,511.55 ha across their concessions in West, Central, and East Kalimantan. Five of these companies received government-enforced compliance orders. A sixth, PT MPK, had its operating permit suspended alongside an enforcement order after investigators discovered extensive, recurring burns across its land.

Yet enforcement remains the ultimate bottleneck: identifying the actual culprits behind the blazes and imposing penalties severe enough to serve as a genuine deterrent.

At home, the toll is devastating. More than 1.4 million students have been forced back into remote learning due to toxic, hazardous air. In Palembang, South Sumatra, the closures disrupted around 250,000 students across 1,030 schools. Meanwhile, health authorities recorded more than 50,000 cases of acute respiratory infections across seven provinces between July and August alone.

A recent assessment by the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) estimated the combined economic and healthcare losses from the January–August fires at Rp 39.3 trillion (US$2.25 billion) to Rp 123.1 trillion. The upper end of that estimate represents nearly half, 49.1 percent, of Central Kalimantan’s projected 2026 regional GDP.

The fallout, however, does not stop there. Malaysia has felt the brunt of the drifting plume. On Sept. 4, authorities declared an emergency in Serian, Sarawak, as air quality deteriorated to hazardous levels, shuttering schools across the state. The haze has even reached the Philippines, pushing air quality readings in Manila into unhealthy territory. Faced with fouled air, Malaysia and Brunei have moved to escalate the matter through regional channels, reviving diplomatic frictions that have simmered for decades.

On paper, ASEAN possesses a tailored mechanism for precisely this challenge: the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP), adopted in 2002 and ratified by Indonesia in 2014. The pact outlines clear protocols for monitoring, prevention, emergency response, and joint mitigation. Yet the treaty cannot supplant domestic law enforcement. Pinpointing who lit a blaze, proving whether a concession holder failed to safeguard its perimeter, and meting out punishment remain sovereign duties.

Herein lies the regional framework’s greatest limitation. ASEAN can streamline satellite data and coordinate disaster teams, but it cannot march into an Indonesian concession to enforce the law. A regional accord can mitigate the fallout from a haze crisis; it cannot dismantle the economic incentives that ignite the fires in the first place. Regional coordination is underway. In late August, the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre triggered a Level 3 alert for the southern ASEAN region, signaling intense fire activity and an imminent risk of severe transboundary haze.

Indonesia has navigated major haze crises before, yet the skies continue to darken every dry season. For a public weary of choking on smoke and increasingly skeptical of official assurances, deploying more water-bombing helicopters is no longer enough. Meaningful progress requires naming names, prosecuting offenders, and ensuring corporate negligence carries real, biting costs. The most urgent test ultimately rests with Jakarta: proving it can stop the next fire before it turns into yet another national emergency and regional embarrassment.

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