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Finance

Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.

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Finance

Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.

With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.

Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.

Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.

Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.

In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.

Latest News

November 16, 2026

Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation as vice president marks a turning point, not only for his own career but for the balance of power within Indonesia’s governing elite. With his resignation letter delivered to President Prabowo Subianto on Nov. 11, the drama over his future appears to have entered its final phase.

The resignation is not yet legally complete, but the remaining steps are largely constitutional formalities. The president must forward the letter to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which must endorse it and then begin selecting a new vice president. The more consequential question is no longer whether Gibran stays, but what his departure means for Indonesian politics.

The resignation does not necessarily end efforts in the House of Representatives to pursue the “right to express opinion” (HMP) process on his impeachment. Proponents have strong incentives to continue. Doing so would put Gibran’s removal beyond dispute, whether through resignation or formal constitutional judgement, and would let legislators establish a political and constitutional record of the events behind the crisis. For his opponents, resignation may not be enough; they may want a definitive MPR repudiation of his legitimacy.

Yet the significance extends well beyond one officeholder. Gibran’s vice presidency was never merely a constitutional post. He was the most visible and institutionalized link between Prabowo and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s seventh president, who served from 2014 to 2024, and Gibran’s father. Through Gibran, Jokowi kept direct influence inside the administration after leaving office, and his political network retained representation at the highest level, sustaining the appearance of a joint enterprise forged in the 2024 election.

That arrangement has now been fundamentally weakened. Gibran’s departure removes Jokowi’s most important institutional foothold in government. Prabowo holds the authority of office, control of the state apparatus and a large coalition in the legislature, while Jokowi becomes increasingly dependent on informal networks. The relationship has been evolving for some time, but the resignation accelerates the shift from a shared arrangement to a government unmistakably centered on Prabowo.

Many political actors have already recognized this. Three senior figures reportedly left the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) while keeping their cabinet posts, further reducing Jokowi’s leverage. The PSI has often been viewed as his political vehicle, particularly since he left office, so their decision reads as a declaration that loyalty to the President now outranks loyalty to the party. In politics, loyalty tends to follow power, and the drift toward the presidential center reflects an emerging consensus that Indonesia’s political future revolves around Prabowo rather than Jokowi. Gibran’s resignation reinforces that perception by removing one of the principal symbols of Jokowi’s continuing influence.

Ironically, Gibran may have done the governing coalition a favor. Had he stayed and fought the allegations, Indonesia could have faced months of political warfare. An impeachment would almost certainly have been ugly, prolonged and divisive: coalition parties forced to take sides, ministers pressured to defend or abandon the Vice President, and hearings and constitutional arguments dominating the national agenda. Prabowo would have been trapped between defending his elected running mate and protecting his administration’s credibility, while the opposition gained a powerful platform.

By stepping aside, Gibran has greatly reduced the likelihood of that scenario. The constitutional machinery may keep moving, but a drawn-out battle now looks far less likely. The greatest casualty, however, is likely to be Gibran himself. Before this crisis he was widely seen as a plausible 2029 presidential contender. As the son of a popular former president and a sitting vice president, he naturally invited such speculation. Recent months have dramatically altered that trajectory.

He has said he will keep defending himself through legal channels, notably before the State Administrative Court (PTUN). A favorable ruling on the educational credential controversy could let him argue he was unfairly targeted and restore some personal credibility. But a legal victory is not a political revival. Legitimacy is shaped by public perception, collective memory and political narrative, not by courts alone. Even complete vindication would not erase voters’ memories of the controversy over the Constitutional Court decision that enabled his candidacy, or the later disputes over his qualifications.

Indonesia has seen political comebacks, Prabowo’s being a prime example, but they require reinvention, time and a compelling new story. Gibran would be attempting one where the central issue is the legitimacy of his own rise. A serious 2029 candidacy therefore now looks remote.

Ultimately, the larger implications may concern his father. For more than a decade Jokowi dominated Indonesian politics, but influence after leaving office depends on institutions, networks and successors, and all three now appear under pressure. Gibran is leaving the vice presidency, the PSI looks increasingly fragile as a vehicle, elites are reorienting toward Prabowo, and controversies around figures long associated with Jokowi raise questions about his network’s durability.

None of this means Jokowi has ceased to matter. He remains one of Indonesia’s most influential figures and commands substantial public support. But can he shape outcomes without a successor in office? Can the PSI stay relevant without access to power? Can he remain a kingmaker in a landscape increasingly dominated by Prabowo? Those questions remain open. What is clearer is that Gibran’s resignation may be remembered less as the fall of a vice president than as the decisive moment in the transition from the Jokowi era to a fully Prabowo-centered political order.

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