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Finance
Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.
Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.
Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.
Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.
In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.
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The Red and White Cooperative (KDMP) initiative is rapidly transforming from a flagship economic program into a mandate that must succeed at any cost. In its wake, the program is now cannibalizing the Village Fund, the very backbone of rural development and a decade-long symbol of local empowerment.
Earlier this month, Finance Ministry Regulation No. 7/2026 on Village Fund Management issued a startling directive requiring that 58 percent of all Village Funds be diverted to the KDMP. This mandate drastically strangles the budgetary autonomy of local leaders across the archipelago.
With the 2026 Village Fund ceiling set at Rp 60.6 trillion (US$3.6 billion) for distribution to 75,260 villages, each community receives an average of Rp 805 million. Under these new provisions, villages are left with a meager Rp 332 million to address locally determined needs.
For the nearly 60 percent of Indonesian villages that generate zero internal revenue, the Village Fund is not a supplementary "bonus", it is their entire lifeline for survival and growth.
Since 2015, fiscal decentralization has allowed villages to evolve from passive recipients of aid into autonomous planners. The results were measurable, as the number of self-sufficient villages skyrocketed from a mere 173 in 2015 to over 20,500 by 2025. This progress was built on the principle that local people know their needs better than the central government.
By mandating how over half of these funds are spent, the government risks reverting villages into mere branch offices of a central bureaucracy. The friction is already visible in regions like Kediri and Lamongan, both in East Java, where public outcry erupted over plans to pave over village soccer fields to make room for cooperative offices. These local landmarks have become symbols of a top-down approach that prioritizes national quotas over social cohesion.
This shift creates a glaring political contradiction. During the 2024 campaign, the Prabowo-Gibran ticket pledged to quintuple the Village Fund to Rp 5 billion per village. Instead, the current reallocation feels like a "policy paradox" to critics who supported that vision.
The financial logistics further complicate the narrative. While the KDMP was initially framed as a low-impact Rp 40 trillion loan scheme backed by state-owned banks, recent contracts to import 105,000 pickup trucks from India—valued at approximately Rp 24.66 trillion—have raised eyebrows in the House of Representatives. Critics question how a program built on the narrative of "national sovereignty" justifies such a massive reliance on foreign industrial imports.
Perhaps the most concerning dimension is the expanding role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in the KDMP’s rollout. While the military is legally permitted to assist in operations other than war, the construction of cooperatives is neither a humanitarian crisis nor an emergency response.
While proponents cite the military’s territorial efficiency, the normalization of military involvement in civilian economic projects blurs a vital line. In a healthy democracy, civilian authorities—not the military—should manage the wheels of commerce and rural development. This encroachment risks creating a "command and control" economy in the countryside, which is often at odds with the collaborative spirit of traditional cooperatives.
The broader question is not whether cooperatives are a valid tool for rural growth; they certainly can be. The question is whether the state is willing to dismantle a decade of successful decentralization to build them.
By diverting local funds and expanding military participation in grassroots economics, the government risks sacrificing the very principles of local empowerment that have underpinned Indonesia’s rural transformation for the past decade.
If the KDMP is to succeed, it should be an addition to the village's strength, not a replacement for its autonomy.
