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Finance
Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
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Finance
Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.
Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.
Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.
Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.
In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.
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Pos Indonesia, the country's oldest state-owned enterprise (SOE), has come under renewed scrutiny following the resignation of its president director, Daud Joseph, after only three months in office. His departure was followed by allegations of governance irregularities, including suspected manipulation of the company's financial statements, prompting state asset fund Danantara to launch an audit. The episode underscores the persistent weaknesses in SOE governance that have contributed to the sector's underperformance for years.
Joseph was appointed president director on March 11 after previously serving as operations and safety director at Transjakarta. He filled a leadership vacancy that had been occupied by an acting president director for nearly a year. On June 22, however, Joseph resigned, saying Pos Indonesia required a leader with more specialized expertise to carry out the company's transformation.
His resignation came amid a sharp deterioration in the company's financial performance. Pos Indonesia's revenue fell by 20 percent in 2025, declining from Rp 5.02 trillion (US$286 million) to Rp 3.97 trillion. This was well below the company's five-year average revenue of Rp 5.06 trillion and marked its lowest annual revenue since 2013. Consequently, gross profit declined to Rp 1.5 trillion.
The decline was driven partly by lower logistics revenue from government social assistance distribution programs, including cash, rice and food aid, which fell to only Rp 300 billion. Beyond government-related services, Pos Indonesia also recorded weaker revenue from its logistics, courier and property businesses. By the first half of 2025, the parent company had posted an operating loss of Rp 37.92 billion. Operating cash flow also remained under pressure, with a negative balance of Rp 677.52 billion, extending a trend that began in 2024.
Beyond its weakening financial performance, governance failures have created additional risks for the company. In June 2025, Pos Indonesia disclosed estimated losses of Rp 37.73 billion resulting from employee fraud, up from Rp 34.49 billion estimated at the end of 2024. Around half of the estimated losses originated from the company's Makassar regional office. These figures remain subject to an ongoing audit as investigators examine misconduct that accumulated over several years.
Employee fraud has repeatedly surfaced within Pos Indonesia, ranging from the misappropriation of social assistance funds to broader operational misconduct. Last month, authorities arrested a fugitive linked to corruption in the distribution of funds under the Family Hope Program (PKH) in Cirebon, a case that caused state losses of Rp 264.55 million. Another corruption case in Bengkulu involved the misuse of stamp duty revenue and pension funds between 2022 and 2024, resulting in estimated state losses of around Rp 3 billion.
These recurring governance failures stand in stark contrast to Pos Indonesia's financial recovery after 2019. The company successfully reversed a comprehensive net loss of Rp 104.38 billion in 2019 into a comprehensive net profit of Rp 839 billion in 2024. However, the downturn appears to have resumed, with comprehensive net income reaching only Rp 144.74 billion in the first half of 2025.
The combination of deteriorating financial performance and suspected governance failures has prompted Danantara to intervene. The sovereign wealth fund plans to appoint a new management team to restore Pos Indonesia as a financially healthy, professionally managed and accountable company. Since its establishment, Danantara has consistently emphasized improving governance standards across SOEs by strengthening financial reporting and enforcing accountability for misconduct.
Nevertheless, the impact of these reforms has yet to become evident. Several major SOEs, including MIND ID and Telkom Indonesia, reported weaker financial performance in 2025. Questions have also emerged over Danantara's own reporting practices. For example, Danantara reported Bank Rakyat Indonesia's (BRI) profit at Rp 21.2 trillion for the first four months of this year, while the bank's official financial statements recorded net profit of Rp 15.9 trillion, raising concerns about data consistency and transparency.
The problems at Pos Indonesia should therefore not be viewed as an isolated corporate failure, but as a reflection of longstanding structural weaknesses in Indonesia's SOE governance framework. Unless these underlying issues are addressed, governance reforms under Danantara are unlikely to deliver lasting improvements in SOE performance.
