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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.
Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.
Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.
Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.
In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.
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The contribution of natural resource export receipt (DHE) to Indonesia's foreign reserves remains limited, intensifying calls to revise Government Regulation (PP) No. 8/2025 on DHE. While the policy temporarily keeps export proceeds onshore, much of the forex (forex) ultimately flows back overseas to service external debt. As a result, the regulation has fallen short of its stated goal of strengthening reserves, an issue that has become more urgent as the rupiah faces renewed depreciation pressures.
Furthermore, exporters have continued to voice their increasing frustration with the DHE lock-up, especially after the lock-up period was extended earlier this year from a minimum of 3 months to 12 months for non-oil and gas DHE. Despite mounting complaints, the government has been reluctant to significantly loosen the rules, arguing that a major relaxation could prompt exporters to quickly shift funds offshore once constraints are lifted.
However, the government's re-examination of PP No. 8/2025 unexpectedly revealed a potential loophole that has allowed certain exporters to move funds out of the special accounts where DHE are intended to remain locked. Finance Minister Purbaya has acknowledged the issue and stated that the regulation will be reviewed, but he has also cautioned businesses to keep their expectations reasonable, noting that any revisions will likely focus on narrow technical adjustments rather than a broad policy overhaul.
Bank Indonesia (BI) has added that the compliance rate for the DHE lock-up exceeds 95 percent. This implies that the loophole, while problematic, is technically permissible under the existing legal framework.
The rupiah's continued depreciation has added a new layer of urgency to these concerns. The currency slipped to Rp 16.760 per United States dollar on Nov. 18, its weakest level so far this month, intensifying scrutiny over policies that might be limiting forex liquidity in the domestic market, such as the DHE lock-up.
Compounding to these challenges, BI has been unable to lower the BI Rate, holding it at 4.75 percent in November due to persistent inflation and heightened global uncertainty. With room for monetary easing is constrained, BI has fewer tools available to stabilize the rupiah, making it even more important that existing forex regulations do not unintentionally dampen market liquidity.
This brings renewed attention to one of the key weaknesses of the DHE lock-up mechanism: the very limited range of activities for which the funds can be used. Under Article 11A of PP No. 8/2025, exporters may deploy locked-up proceeds for only a handful of purposes, one of the most common being the repayment of foreign debt. In practice, this means that the forex kept onshore ends up flowing back overseas relatively quickly—reducing any meaningful accumulation of forex reserves and undermining the policy's initial intent.
Moreover, for the funds to contribute to the domestic foreign-exchange market in a more direct way, exporters would need to convert the DHE into rupiah. However, this burdens businesses since their operational expenses, revenues, and financial obligations are predominantly denominated in foreign currency. This structural reluctance limits the policy's impact on rupiah liquidity, reinforcing the argument that a more flexible and economically aligned revision of PP No. 8/2025 is becoming increasingly necessary.
A potential path forward, compromising between exporter demands for greater flexibility and policymakers' insistence on keeping export proceeds onshore, is to slightly expand the allowable uses of locked-up DHE funds rather than dismantling the lock-up altogether. One commonly raised proposal is to allow exporters to use a portion of their locked-up funds to purchase foreign currency-denominated government securities (SBN) issued in the domestic market. For exporters, this allows an interest-bearing option that keeps their holdings in foreign currency while simultaneously channeling forex into the national reserves.
