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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
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Indonesia’s financial sector has been flourishing over the past half decade. The COVID-19 pandemic period, while being a time of austerity for most sectors, led to revolutionary innovations in Indonesia’s financial services industry, particularly in fintech. From December 2020 to December 2022, total assets of the fintech sector grew by 48.54 percent from 2020 to 2022. This growing trend continued even after the pandemic lockdowns ended, as total assets in fintech grew by 30.8 percent from December 2022 to December 2023.
With fintech paving the way forward, traditional banking followed suit by revolutionizing its services. From 2022 to 2023, the banking industry’s fund distribution increased by 6.28 percent, source of funds increased by 6.33 percent, and total assets in the industry grew by 6.98 percent, reaching a total of US$8.22 trillion. Moreover, even regional banks have been benefitting from this wave of innovation. For the same period from 2022 to 2023, the regional banking sector saw a 7.67 percent in distributed funds, an 8.08 percent increase in source of funds, and a 7.52 percent increase in total assets, reaching a total of US$137.96 billion.
Innovations in Indonesia’s finance sector extend beyond financial services. On September 2023, the Indonesian monetary authority, Bank Indonesia (BI), introduced three pro-market monetary instruments that function as short-term fixed income securities with high coupon rates. The three instruments, SRBI, SUVBI, and SUVBI, were able to collect Rp 409 trillion (US$25.2 billion), US$2.31 billion, and US$387 million, respectively.
Particularly in the case of the SRBI, this instrument represented an innovative way to attract capital flow from abroad during a period of high credit costs and slow investment. Approximately 20.77 percent, or Rp 85.02 trillion (US$ 5.26 billion), of the total outstanding SRBI were owned by non-Indonesian residents, underscoring the SRBI’s success as a monetary instrument.
Even when compared to other countries in the same region, the Indonesian finance sector stands out for its stability against fluctuations. Throughout 2023, the global cost of credit was high due to hawkish Fed policies made to curb US inflation, resulting in a stagnation of capital flow on a global scale. Entering the second quarter of 2024, the composite index of many Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Thailand recorded price decreases compared to the same period last year, reaching -3.96 percent and -13.9 percent on the Straits Times Index (STI) and the Bangkok SET index, respectively. Meanwhile, the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JKSE) recorded a price increase of 5.18 percent for the same one-year period.
In summary, the Indonesian financial sector stands out for its stability and consistency, maintaining growth through innovation even during periods of austerity or global uncertainty. This consistency is also reflected in its GDP, which grew by 7.4 percent from 2022 to 2023, contributing roughly 4.16 percent to the national GDP in 2023.
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As the country’s investment climate deteriorates, the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia (CCCI) took the unusual step of writing directly to President Prabowo Subianto to complain about shifting regulations, nickel quota cuts, royalty hikes and alleged extortion. This raises troubling questions: Is the government losing control of policy consistency or quietly yielding regulatory authority to its largest investor?
In the letter, Chinese investors laid out a familiar catalog of concerns, arguing that the investment environment in Indonesia had become increasingly difficult to navigate due to inconsistent regulations and heavy-handed enforcement. The investors criticized what they described as excessive and non-transparent law enforcement, where authorities possessed overly broad discretionary powers that created uncertainty for businesses.
They also raised allegations of corruption, extortion and a growing reliance on expensive “third-party intermediaries” to resolve licensing and operational disputes. At the same time, they alleged that successive hikes in royalties, taxes, tax inspections and multimillion-dollar fines had created panic among mining and downstream processing companies. These concerns were further amplified by the government’s mandatory foreign exchange retention policy, requiring exporters to keep 50 percent of their export proceeds in domestic banks for one year, which investors said disrupted liquidity and long-term operational flexibility.
Much of their frustration centered on Indonesia’s nickel sector, where Chinese firms dominate much of the downstream smelter and battery supply chain. For example, investors protested the government’s decision to slash nickel ore quotas more than 70 percent, arguing that it could reduce production by roughly 30 million tonnes a year and severely disrupt the downstream industrial ecosystem.
They also criticized the new formula for calculating the mineral benchmark price (HPM), which they claimed caused nickel ore prices to surge as much as 200 percent, thereby worsening operational losses across the supply chain. The investors noted that these policies threatened existing projects, would discourage future investment and put more than 400,000 jobs linked to the sector at risk.
Aside from mining, investors also complained about tighter visa rules for foreign workers, which they described as increasingly costly and restrictive for technical and managerial personnel. Other issues related to proposed export levies, reduced electric vehicle incentives and curbs to tax relief in special economic zones, all of which contributed to a growing sense of regulatory unpredictability, they said.
At its core, the CCCI’s concerns reflect a deeper shift in Indonesia’s economic direction under the current administration. Policies such as mandatory retention of foreign exchange earnings in state-owned banks, tighter control over mineral exports, mandates for downstream industries and rising state intervention suggest that Indonesia is moving away from its traditionally liberal foreign exchange regime toward a model based more on state capitalism.
Ultimately, the controversy surrounding the CCCI’s letter is not merely about nickel quotas or royalty hikes. It reflects a broader tension between the government’s ambition to assert greater control over Indonesia’s natural resources and its continued dependence on foreign capital to sustain industrialization. The government wants to move the country up the value chain, strengthen domestic financial liquidity and reduce reliance on external forces, but these goals require long-term investor confidence: something that cannot exist without regulatory consistency and credible governance.
