As Indonesia continues to grapple with spreading wildfires and recurring haze, scrutiny has increasingly shifted toward corporate culpability, driven by investigative reports linking vast networks of foreign investors and multinational firms to the blazes. With Jakarta’s domestic response perceived as largely muted, neighboring ASEAN member states have begun mounting diplomatic pressure and pursuing independent investigations into the entities allegedly responsible for the transboundary haze choking the region.

Much of the recent attention stems from an investigation published by the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi), which identified nine corporations directly tied to major wildfire hot spots: PT Kayung Agro Lestari, PT Panca Surya Agrindo, PT Arjuna Utama Sawit, PT Sumber Mardhika Graha, PT Finnantara Intiga, PT Hutan Ketapang Industri, PT Mayawana Persada, PT Hermes Sugar Indonesia and PT Globalindo Alam Perkasa.

Walhi’s findings reveal that all nine maintain parent companies or principal shareholders based primarily in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, alongside additional financial links to the British Virgin Islands, Samoa and India. Given that Singapore and Malaysia bear the brunt of the cross-border haze outside Indonesia, these commercial ties are especially consequential.

Beyond these nine entities, an estimated 93 companies affiliated with Malaysian and Singaporean palm oil conglomerates have been implicated in the fires. Of these, 66 are linked to Singapore-headquartered giants - most notably Sinar Mas and Wilmar, which account for the largest shares - while the remaining 27 trace back to Malaysian conglomerates, specifically Sime Darby and Genting Group. These complex, cross-border ownership structures significantly complicate efforts to hold individual firms accountable, deepening regional frustration with Indonesia’s management of the perennial crisis.

Singapore, for its part, has escalated unilateral enforcement. Authorities have identified seven companies operating in Indonesia suspected of responsibility for the blazes, including PT Bumi Andalas Permai, PT Bumi Mekar Hijau and PT Paramitra Mulia Langgeng. The Singaporean government announced that these firms will receive preventive measures notices requiring them to deploy firefighting teams, halt all burning, refrain from igniting new fires, and submit formal action plans to Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA).

Domestically, amid persistent criticism over strategic shortcomings, the Forestry Ministry announced administrative sanctions against 32 companies accused of igniting concession fires. The penalties range from operational suspensions to outright license revocations and mandatory ecosystem restoration within affected concessions. However, transparency remains a hurdle, as the government has yet to release the names of the penalized firms.

Beyond immediate enforcement, the deeper structural drivers demand scrutiny. Today’s fires and resultant haze are the cumulative legacy of decades of peatland drainage and forest conversion - practices, as Walhi Executive Director Boy Jerry Even Sembiring emphasized, systematically enabled by state-issued concession permits.

Successive administrations have confronted this recurring crisis with varying degrees of resolve. During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), massive fires in 2006 blanketed Malaysia and Singapore in severe haze and cost the country three million hectares of forest cover. A subsequent outbreak in 2013 prompted Indonesia to finally ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) in 2014, following a rare public apology from Yudhoyono to neighboring nations.

Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s tenure (2014–2024) saw catastrophic fires in 2015 that consumed roughly 2.6 million hectares - predominantly across Central Kalimantan - blanketing the region in toxic haze for months, followed by another severe outbreak in 2019 that burned 850,000 hectares. In response, Jokowi institutionalized a more centralized prevention framework, establishing the Peatland Restoration Agency and issuing Presidential Instruction No. 5/2019, which enacted a permanent moratorium on new concession permits across primary natural forests and peatlands.

Under President Prabowo Subianto, crisis management has thus far leaned heavily on operational interventions, such as mobilizing joint ground and aerial task forces and conducting cloud-seeding weather modification operations. Prabowo has also authorized the acceptance of foreign technical assistance, though the timeline and operational parameters of that deployment remain undefined.

Long-term resolution hinges on confronting the structural governance issues driving deforestation, particularly the entrenched link between concession fires and commercial plantation expansion. Between 2004 and 2017 under Yudhoyono, approximately 2.4 million ha of state forest land were released for commercial estate development, dominated overwhelmingly by oil palm. Under Jokowi, nearly 700,000 hectares of land were converted to oil palm cultivation.

While definitive conversion figures have yet to be established for the Prabowo administration, concerns over policy direction have already surfaced. Special Envoy for Climate and Energy Hashim Djojohadikusumo, who is Prabowo’s brother, recently proposed utilizing 12.7 million ha of "degraded forest" for expanded oil palm cultivation to meet the administration's aggressive B50 and B100 biodiesel mandates - a strategy that critics warn could further exacerbate concession-driven fire risks.