Sector
Fishery
Indonesia, boasting the title of the world’s largest archipelagic country with a vast sea area of 5.8 million square kilometers, stands as one of the largest producers and suppliers in the global fisheries market. The abundance of sea area provides Indonesia with a wealth of fisheries products, making fisheries a national leading sector in the country.
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Indonesia, boasting the title of the world’s largest archipelagic country with a vast sea area of 5.8 million square kilometers, stands as one of the largest producers and suppliers in the global fisheries market. The abundance of sea area provides Indonesia with a wealth of fisheries products, making fisheries a national leading sector in the country.
There are 23 regions where fisheries stand out as a leading sector, supporting local economies and providing food security. These regions encompass Aceh, Bengkulu, Riau, Lampung, South Sumatra, Central Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and North Kalimantan. Other regions include Central Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, West Papua, and Bangka Belitung.
In 2022, Indonesia’s fisheries sector contributed a total of Rp505 trillion to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Building this strong foundation, the country set an ambitious target of reaching US$7.2 billion in fishery exports by the end of 2023. Previously, total fishery product exports had hovered around US$5 billion to US$6 billion.
Supporting the sector’s contribution to the country’s GDP is its production. Throughout the third quarter of 2023, Indonesia’s fisheries production totaled 24.74 million tons. This figure includes both capture fisheries and aquaculture. In aquaculture, the main commodities are seaweed cultivation and shrimp cultivation, while in capture fisheries, the main commodities are tuna, skipjack tuna, and mackerel tuna.
Furthermore, Indonesia’s fisheries sector is experiencing a surge in investment. By the third quarter of 2023, the sector had attracted a total of Rp9.56 trillion in investment, with significant contributions from a mix of domestic sources at Rp5.32 trillion, foreign investors at Rp1.4 trillion, and credit sources at Rp2.84 trillion. Notably, China is the largest foreign investor, contributing Rp370.74 billion, followed by Malaysia with Rp240.4 billion, and Switzerland with Rp152.89 billion, highlighting the increasing international interest in Indonesia’s fisheries potential.
While Indonesia boasts impressive fisheries production and growing investments in its fisheries sector, it is vital to uphold fisheries regulations. These regulations ensure that this valuable sector thrives alongside healthy marine ecosystems. It is reported that Indonesia is scheduled to enforce a new fisheries policy in 2025, which will see quotas assigned to industrial, local, and non-commercial fishers across six designated fishing zones, covering all 11 fisheries management areas (FMAs) in Indonesia. The new quota system responds to a worrying rise in overexploited FMAs, which have increased to 53 percent from 44 percent in 2017.
Latest News
Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation as vice president marks a turning point, not only for his own career but for the balance of power within Indonesia’s governing elite. With his resignation letter delivered to President Prabowo Subianto on Nov. 11, the drama over his future appears to have entered its final phase.
The resignation is not yet legally complete, but the remaining steps are largely constitutional formalities. The president must forward the letter to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which must endorse it and then begin selecting a new vice president. The more consequential question is no longer whether Gibran stays, but what his departure means for Indonesian politics.
The resignation does not necessarily end efforts in the House of Representatives to pursue the “right to express opinion” (HMP) process on his impeachment. Proponents have strong incentives to continue. Doing so would put Gibran’s removal beyond dispute, whether through resignation or formal constitutional judgement, and would let legislators establish a political and constitutional record of the events behind the crisis. For his opponents, resignation may not be enough; they may want a definitive MPR repudiation of his legitimacy.
Yet the significance extends well beyond one officeholder. Gibran’s vice presidency was never merely a constitutional post. He was the most visible and institutionalized link between Prabowo and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s seventh president, who served from 2014 to 2024, and Gibran’s father. Through Gibran, Jokowi kept direct influence inside the administration after leaving office, and his political network retained representation at the highest level, sustaining the appearance of a joint enterprise forged in the 2024 election.
That arrangement has now been fundamentally weakened. Gibran’s departure removes Jokowi’s most important institutional foothold in government. Prabowo holds the authority of office, control of the state apparatus and a large coalition in the legislature, while Jokowi becomes increasingly dependent on informal networks. The relationship has been evolving for some time, but the resignation accelerates the shift from a shared arrangement to a government unmistakably centered on Prabowo.
Many political actors have already recognized this. Three senior figures reportedly left the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) while keeping their cabinet posts, further reducing Jokowi’s leverage. The PSI has often been viewed as his political vehicle, particularly since he left office, so their decision reads as a declaration that loyalty to the President now outranks loyalty to the party. In politics, loyalty tends to follow power, and the drift toward the presidential center reflects an emerging consensus that Indonesia’s political future revolves around Prabowo rather than Jokowi. Gibran’s resignation reinforces that perception by removing one of the principal symbols of Jokowi’s continuing influence.
Ironically, Gibran may have done the governing coalition a favor. Had he stayed and fought the allegations, Indonesia could have faced months of political warfare. An impeachment would almost certainly have been ugly, prolonged and divisive: coalition parties forced to take sides, ministers pressured to defend or abandon the Vice President, and hearings and constitutional arguments dominating the national agenda. Prabowo would have been trapped between defending his elected running mate and protecting his administration’s credibility, while the opposition gained a powerful platform.
By stepping aside, Gibran has greatly reduced the likelihood of that scenario. The constitutional machinery may keep moving, but a drawn-out battle now looks far less likely. The greatest casualty, however, is likely to be Gibran himself. Before this crisis he was widely seen as a plausible 2029 presidential contender. As the son of a popular former president and a sitting vice president, he naturally invited such speculation. Recent months have dramatically altered that trajectory.
He has said he will keep defending himself through legal channels, notably before the State Administrative Court (PTUN). A favorable ruling on the educational credential controversy could let him argue he was unfairly targeted and restore some personal credibility. But a legal victory is not a political revival. Legitimacy is shaped by public perception, collective memory and political narrative, not by courts alone. Even complete vindication would not erase voters’ memories of the controversy over the Constitutional Court decision that enabled his candidacy, or the later disputes over his qualifications.
Indonesia has seen political comebacks, Prabowo’s being a prime example, but they require reinvention, time and a compelling new story. Gibran would be attempting one where the central issue is the legitimacy of his own rise. A serious 2029 candidacy therefore now looks remote.
Ultimately, the larger implications may concern his father. For more than a decade Jokowi dominated Indonesian politics, but influence after leaving office depends on institutions, networks and successors, and all three now appear under pressure. Gibran is leaving the vice presidency, the PSI looks increasingly fragile as a vehicle, elites are reorienting toward Prabowo, and controversies around figures long associated with Jokowi raise questions about his network’s durability.
None of this means Jokowi has ceased to matter. He remains one of Indonesia’s most influential figures and commands substantial public support. But can he shape outcomes without a successor in office? Can the PSI stay relevant without access to power? Can he remain a kingmaker in a landscape increasingly dominated by Prabowo? Those questions remain open. What is clearer is that Gibran’s resignation may be remembered less as the fall of a vice president than as the decisive moment in the transition from the Jokowi era to a fully Prabowo-centered political order.
