Sector
Trading
Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.
View moreTrading
Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.
In terms of exports, Indonesia’s top export commodity has historically been mineral-based fuels, especially coal. However, in the global market, Indonesia is a superpower in the exports of vegetable oils, particularly palm oil, having captured roughly 20 percent of the market with a total export value of US$35.2 billion in 2022. Behind that, Indonesia also leads in nickel exports, with a total export value reaching US$5.8 trillion or 14 percent of global exports.
In 2023, China emerged as Indonesia’s top partner for both exports and imports, with a total annual value of US$62.3 billion and US$62.2 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, the nation’s next top export destination is the US, with a total annual value of US$ 23.2 billion, while the next top import country of origin is Japan, with a total annual value of US$ 16.4 billion.
For trades on the level of individual consumers, the main driver of growth has been the rise in e-commerce throughout the past few years. E-commerce gross market value (GMV) grew by 20 percent from US$48 billion in 2021 to US$58 billion in 2022. This growth persisted to 2023, as e-commerce GMV grew by 7 percent to US$62 billion. E-commerce grew rapidly as it provided a means for Indonesian consumers to maintain access to goods and services during the pandemic period of 2020-2022. However, by the time the pandemic ended, e-commerce had grown ubiquitous and became a staple in the day-to-day lives of the average Indonesian.
Meanwhile, the domestic retail sector in Indonesia is driven by the sale of automotives. The retail of automotives alone in the country reached a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$174.35 billion in 2023, contributing to roughly 13.53 percent of Indonesia’s total GDP of US$1.3 trillion for that year at current market prices. Moreover, the country also achieved a per capita GDP of US$ 4,919.
Strong trade growth followed by increasing access to goods has bolstered local consumer confidence in Indonesia despite the period of uncertainty throughout 2023. According to Bank Indonesia’s monthly consumer confidence survey, Indonesians entered 2024 with high confidence, with the confidence index rising from 123.8 in December 2023 to 125.0 in January 2024. Moreover, this increase is even higher compared to same period the previous year, as a consumer confidence index of 123.0 was recorded for January 2023.
Latest News
The government plans to shift energy import procurement from Pertamina to the Oil and Gas Testing Center, or Lemigas, a public service agency (BLU) under the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry. The move could reshape control over the country's lucrative energy trade. The government argues that direct negotiations with supplier countries will speed up procurement, eliminate intermediaries and secure supplies, but will the new arrangement bring greater transparency and a shorter supply chain or merely add another industry player?
Coordinating Downstream and Energy Transition Minister Bahlil Lahadalia, who is concurrently the energy minister, has cited Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 107/2026 as the basis for the change. Lemigas is to procure crude oil, fuel and liquefied petroleum gas through government-to-government (G2G) or government-to-business (G2B) agreements, then sell the supplies to Pertamina.
Pertamina president director Simon Aloysius Mantiri backs the policy. Bahlil has clarified that private importers will not be required to use Lemigas. Pertamina's infrastructure remains essential for receiving, processing and distributing the imports. Purchasing decisions must therefore match refinery requirements, storage capacity and delivery schedules. Separating authority over contracts from responsibility for delivery makes coordination more important as negotiations become faster.
The same distinction between contractual changes and practical benefits applies to Bahlil's promise to eliminate "shell companies”. Intermediaries that provide financing, logistics or access to suppliers perform a different role from entities that merely add fees or conceal who benefits.
Removing a company from a contract does not eliminate its functions or the costs of replacing them. The real test is whether Lemigas can secure those services on better terms. Disclosing supplier identities, beneficial owners, selection criteria and third-party fees would make that assessment possible.
Financing illustrates why these underlying arrangements matter. Bahlil has said procurement will not draw on the state budget, without identifying an alternative source of funds. Yet these commitments leave payment obligations unexplained.
If Pertamina finances the purchases, it could bear risks from contracts negotiated elsewhere. If commercial partners provide financing, their charges and conditions must be included in procurement costs. Who pays suppliers, approves financing terms and absorbs losses will determine whether cheaper cargoes actually translate into cheaper deliveries.
The timing also deserves scrutiny.
Signed on April 30, Perpres No. 26/2026 enabled Lemigas to undertake imports. Officials initially justified the arrangement as a workaround for Pertamina's bond covenants, which complicated purchases of sanctioned Russian crude.
Its first cargo, around 770,000 barrels, arrived in late June at Lawe-Lawe, East Kalimantan, aboard a sanctioned tanker. Less than six months later, the government introduced Perpres No. 107/2026 making Lemigas the default channel for Pertamina's imports, a trade worth US$32.8 billion last year.
Yet the government has not explained whether the initial purchase delivered savings or reduced sanctions exposure, and the regulation's text was publicly unavailable when the change was announced. An exception is being expanded without a public account of whether it worked.
Will Lemigas remove a layer from the supply chain or become a new one? The center has a background in research and testing, and industry practitioner Hadi Ismoyo has questioned its trading experience.
It will need commercial partners, yet Bahlil has neither identified the companies selected to develop storage facilities nor explained how they were chosen. Perpres No. 26/2026's provision on pricing flexibility during urgent procurement makes contract scrutiny particularly important.
Removing existing traders offers little assurance of savings if replacements enter through equally opaque arrangements. The core problems remain transparency and accountability.
The government should publish the Perpres, identify partners and selection criteria, benchmark landed costs and open transactions to audit. Otherwise, the reform risks changing intermediaries while adding another contractual layer.
The government has made a case for stronger bargaining power but has yet to establish why centralizing procurement in Lemigas is the best way to exercise this.
The ministerial agency’s expanded role must justify itself through lower total costs, reliable deliveries and decisions that withstand public scrutiny. Until those benefits are demonstrated, the clearest change is who controls the contracts.
Greater state control can strengthen energy security, but only if the power to choose suppliers comes with a clear obligation to account for the results.
