“When will you get married?” It is one of the most common, and often intrusive questions at family gatherings in Indonesia. Ironically, it is directed at the very generation that now dominates the country’s demographic structure: young people. As marriage is increasingly delayed, this cohort reflects broader structural and economic shifts reshaping Indonesian society. Declining marriage rates have been followed by falling fertility and birth rates, raising a deeper concern that Indonesia may enter an era of population aging sooner than expected.

The paradox is clear. Indonesia is undergoing a demographic transition more typical of developed economies, without having achieved comparable income levels or institutional readiness, or what economists describe as a “getting old before getting rich” scenario. What kind of demographic future, then, is the country heading toward?

Over the past decade, marriage rates in Indonesia have declined steadily, falling from around 2.1 million marriages in the mid-2010s to roughly 1.4 million in 2024. While the decline became more pronounced after 2019, the trend was already underway well before the COVID-19 pandemic, which largely acted as an accelerator rather than a trigger. At the same time, the average age at first marriage has risen for both men and women. These changes matter well beyond family formation.

Shifting marriage patterns are now translating into measurable changes in fertility dynamics and population structure. Census data show that the total fertility rate has declined sharply over the past five decades, from 5.6 children per woman in the early 1970s to around 2.1 in 2023, close to replacement level.

This sustained decline implies slower cohort replacement and weaker growth among younger age groups. The demographic impact is increasingly visible in Indonesia’s population pyramid, which is gradually narrowing at the base while expanding at older age brackets. Data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) indicate that the elderly population increased by around four percentage points over the past decade, pushing the share of those aged 60 and above to approximately 12 percent in 2024.

A population is generally considered “aging” once the share of those aged 60 and above exceeds 10 percent. Indonesia crossed this threshold roughly two years ago, placing it firmly on an aging trajectory even as its demographic dividend remains incomplete.

This shift carries significant economic consequences. Slower growth in the working-age population will gradually constrain labor supply, while population aging increases the old-age dependency burden. In 2024, the elderly dependency ratio reached 17.76 percent, meaning that for every 100 people of productive age, there were roughly 17 to 18 elderly individuals to support.

The trend poses growing challenges for Indonesia’s pension system, which remains limited in coverage and heavily dependent on contributions from current workers. As the number of retirees rises faster than the formal labor force, sustaining pension adequacy without placing additional strain on public finances becomes increasingly difficult.

An aging population also implies higher spending on health care and social protection, while the tax base expands more slowly. Without sufficient gains in productivity and formal employment, Indonesia risks falling into “getting old before getting rich” scenario, in which demographic aging outpaces income growth and institutional readiness.

Understanding why the younger generation is delaying marriage is therefore central to Indonesia’s demographic challenge. For many Gen Z Indonesians, marriage is increasingly seen as a long-term commitment that requires financial stability, emotional readiness and aligned life goals, conditions that are harder to meet amid prolonged education and persistent labor market precarity.

Rising housing costs and the growing expense of child-rearing further raise the threshold for family formation. At the same time, shifting gender norms and expanded opportunities for women have reshaped life-course expectations, making marriage less of an immediate priority. The decline in marriage rates does not reflect a diminished value placed on marriage itself, but a more cautious and calculated approach shaped by structural economic constraints and changing social expectations.

Indonesia’s demographic challenge should not be reduced to individual choices or generational attitudes. Delayed marriage and declining fertility are symptoms of deeper structural shifts in education, labor markets, housing and gender roles. As the country moves toward an aging society, the central issue is not how to persuade young people to marry, but how to align economic institutions with changing life-course realities.

Without reforms that improve job security, productivity and support for family formation, demographic aging risks becoming a constraint rather than a dividend. The question, then, is no longer when young Indonesians will marry, but whether the economy and the state are prepared for the demographic future already taking shape.