Sector

Trading

Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.

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Trading

Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.

In terms of exports, Indonesia’s top export commodity has historically been mineral-based fuels, especially coal. However, in the global market, Indonesia is a superpower in the exports of vegetable oils, particularly palm oil, having captured roughly 20 percent of the market with a total export value of US$35.2 billion in 2022. Behind that, Indonesia also leads in nickel exports, with a total export value reaching US$5.8 trillion or 14 percent of global exports.

In 2023, China emerged as Indonesia’s top partner for both exports and imports, with a total annual value of US$62.3 billion and US$62.2 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, the nation’s next top export destination is the US, with a total annual value of US$ 23.2 billion, while the next top import country of origin is Japan, with a total annual value of US$ 16.4 billion.

For trades on the level of individual consumers, the main driver of growth has been the rise in e-commerce throughout the past few years. E-commerce gross market value (GMV) grew by 20 percent from US$48 billion in 2021 to US$58 billion in 2022. This growth persisted to 2023, as e-commerce GMV grew by 7 percent to US$62 billion. E-commerce grew rapidly as it provided a means for Indonesian consumers to maintain access to goods and services during the pandemic period of 2020-2022. However, by the time the pandemic ended, e-commerce had grown ubiquitous and became a staple in the day-to-day lives of the average Indonesian.

Meanwhile, the domestic retail sector in Indonesia is driven by the sale of automotives. The retail of automotives alone in the country reached a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$174.35 billion in 2023, contributing to roughly 13.53 percent of Indonesia’s total GDP of US$1.3 trillion for that year at current market prices. Moreover, the country also achieved a per capita GDP of US$ 4,919.

Strong trade growth followed by increasing access to goods has bolstered local consumer confidence in Indonesia despite the period of uncertainty throughout 2023. According to Bank Indonesia’s monthly consumer confidence survey, Indonesians entered 2024 with high confidence, with the confidence index rising from 123.8 in December 2023 to 125.0 in January 2024. Moreover, this increase is even higher compared to same period the previous year, as a consumer confidence index of 123.0 was recorded for January 2023.

Latest News

October 13, 2026

The latest ruling by the Constitutional Court has raised far more questions than it has answered regarding the educational qualifications of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

In a decision handed down on Oct. 6, the court noted it found no convincing evidence that Gibran possessed a foreign diploma, certificate or other credential that could legitimately serve as the foundation for an Indonesian senior high school equivalency certificate. Yet the court stopped short of annulling Gibran’s candidacy or removing him from office as the petitioners demanded.

In October 2023, the court cleared the path for the eldest son of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, then aged 36, to run for vice president the 2024 general election by ruling that the age of candidacy, set at a minimum 40 years, could be bypassed by individuals who had held an elected regional post. That controversial decision, issued by a bench led by Gibran’s uncle by marriage Anwar Usman, was followed nine days later by Gibran registering as Prabowo Subianto’s running mate. Anwar was subsequently removed as chief justice by the court's ethics council over a severe breach regarding conflict of interest.

The court determined that the petitioners lacked legal standing, precluding a hearing on the petition's merits. It further ruled that Gibran could not be unseated through an election dispute because he ceased to be a candidate the moment he was inaugurated in October 2024. Questions regarding preelection eligibility, the bench reiterated, fell under the purview of other state bodies.

The outcome ensures that this decision alone does not invalidate Gibran’s mandate. However, the legal challenge served an equally potent purpose: laying bare institutional vulnerabilities in the country’s electoral architecture. The Constitutional Court has effectively become a public forum where systemic flaws in election administration are dragged into daylight, even when it lacks the authority to correct them.

Here, the proceedings have cast serious doubt on whether the state properly enforced the most fundamental constitutional and legal requirements for an executive office. That burden of accountability now falls squarely on the General Elections Commission (KPU), the body responsible for vetting Gibran’s eligibility in the first place.

The commission maintains that it complied with existing regulations by referring to a 2019 Education and Culture Ministry certificate recognizing Gibran’s overseas schooling, alongside an accompanying decree from the ministry’s Directorate General of Higher Education. But the court’s observations reveal a glaring chasm between administrative rubber-stamping and substantive verification. As the court underscored, the administrative presumption of validity (vermoeden van rechtmatigheid) must always be grounded in accuracy and due prudence. The ruling starkly illuminated the KPU’s failure to conduct factual verification of the actual educational records underlying the ministry's certification.

This is where the issue transcends Gibran’s individual case. Election administrators are not mere paper collectors. Their core constitutional duty is to ensure that candidates meet every threshold demanded by law. When a fundamental qualification clears the vetting pipeline without its underlying documentary proof ever being verified, the credibility of the entire electoral system is compromised. Formal administrative compliance cannot serve as an excuse for failing to conduct basic due diligence on baseline qualifications. Inevitably, the controversy threatens to further erode public trust in the KPU’s capacity to oversee clean and fair elections.

The immediate question is where accountability goes from here. The House of Representatives presents one avenue. Lawmaker Deddy Sitorus from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has indicated the legislature could pursue the matter through a special committee (Pansus) or formally invoke its right of inquiry. Other factions remain noncommittal. House Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who hails from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, said while the House respected the court’s ruling, the legislature had yet to weigh in on its broader political and legal fallout.

Any legislative push, however, should not be conflated with imminent dismissal. Under Article 7B of the 1945 Constitution, unseating an incumbent president or vice president requires an onerous, multitiered process demanding the endorsement of a House plenary session, adjudication by the Constitutional Court and a final vote before the People’s Consultative Assembly.

The immediate priority is not constitutional crisis but institutional transparency. The court has delineated the limits of its authority; the test now is whether the institutions that do hold jurisdiction have the will to examine what took place before Gibran appeared on the ballot. For the KPU, that requires explaining precisely how his secondary education credentials were confirmed and demonstrating whether its vetting process met legal rigor. For the House, it means determining whether the court's revelations justify formal oversight of electoral governance and the integrity of the agencies involved.

Finally, this episode exposes a structural blind spot: A legal framework full of intricate vetting mechanisms can still prove powerless when credible eligibility disputes surface only after an official has assumed one of the highest offices in the land. The Constitutional Court’s ruling may have shut down a specific legal avenue, but it has not answered how the electoral machinery enabled the circumstances that gave rise to such a dispute in the first place. Whether the KPU and the House confront that institutional lapse or allow basic constitutional thresholds to slide will determine how much credibility remains in the vetting of the nation’s leaders.

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