Sector
Trading
Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.
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Trading
Indonesia, a developing country rich in natural resources and boasting the 4th largest population in the world, maintains an extensive trade presence. In 2023, the national trade balance reached US$480.7 billion, having grown significantly compared to the pre-pandemic period in 2019, when it stood at US$338.96 billion. Moreover, as of March 2024, the country has officially recorded a trade balance surplus for its 47th consecutive month.
In terms of exports, Indonesia’s top export commodity has historically been mineral-based fuels, especially coal. However, in the global market, Indonesia is a superpower in the exports of vegetable oils, particularly palm oil, having captured roughly 20 percent of the market with a total export value of US$35.2 billion in 2022. Behind that, Indonesia also leads in nickel exports, with a total export value reaching US$5.8 trillion or 14 percent of global exports.
In 2023, China emerged as Indonesia’s top partner for both exports and imports, with a total annual value of US$62.3 billion and US$62.2 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, the nation’s next top export destination is the US, with a total annual value of US$ 23.2 billion, while the next top import country of origin is Japan, with a total annual value of US$ 16.4 billion.
For trades on the level of individual consumers, the main driver of growth has been the rise in e-commerce throughout the past few years. E-commerce gross market value (GMV) grew by 20 percent from US$48 billion in 2021 to US$58 billion in 2022. This growth persisted to 2023, as e-commerce GMV grew by 7 percent to US$62 billion. E-commerce grew rapidly as it provided a means for Indonesian consumers to maintain access to goods and services during the pandemic period of 2020-2022. However, by the time the pandemic ended, e-commerce had grown ubiquitous and became a staple in the day-to-day lives of the average Indonesian.
Meanwhile, the domestic retail sector in Indonesia is driven by the sale of automotives. The retail of automotives alone in the country reached a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$174.35 billion in 2023, contributing to roughly 13.53 percent of Indonesia’s total GDP of US$1.3 trillion for that year at current market prices. Moreover, the country also achieved a per capita GDP of US$ 4,919.
Strong trade growth followed by increasing access to goods has bolstered local consumer confidence in Indonesia despite the period of uncertainty throughout 2023. According to Bank Indonesia’s monthly consumer confidence survey, Indonesians entered 2024 with high confidence, with the confidence index rising from 123.8 in December 2023 to 125.0 in January 2024. Moreover, this increase is even higher compared to same period the previous year, as a consumer confidence index of 123.0 was recorded for January 2023.
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Three weeks after the acid attack on Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Kontras) activist Andrie Yunus, investigators have yet to clearly identify who bears ultimate responsibility. What has drawn particular attention is the resignation of the chief of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), framed by the Indonesian Military (TNI) as a form of institutional accountability. Yet, this raises the critical question of whether the move reflects genuine responsibility-taking by the state or signals deeper power struggles within the military.
On the evening of March 12, Andrie Yunus, an activist with Kontras, was attacked with acid while riding home in Central Jakarta. Earlier that day, he recorded a podcast discussing the military’s role in politics. The timing has sharpened concerns about possible links between his advocacy work and the assault.
As of April 1, Andrie remained in the high-care unit at Cipto Mangunkusumo General Hospital (RSCM). He is undergoing intensive treatment, particularly for his eyes, as residual acid exposure has complicated medical assessments and may result in permanent damage. Kontras has described his condition as critical.
President Prabowo Subianto has condemned the attack and pledged that investigators will pursue not only the perpetrators on the ground but also the “highest actors” behind it. He emphasized the need to uncover “who ordered and paid for” the crime and has floated the possibility of establishing an independent fact-finding team.
However, this firm stance unfolds within a layered historical context. As widely documented, Prabowo himself faced allegations of human rights abuses during his military career. While he was never tried in court, he was dismissed from the TNI in 1998 for insubordination. This juxtaposition, between past controversies and present commitments to justice, adds a layer of political complexity to the case.
On March 25, TNI spokesperson Maj. Gen. Aulia Dwi Nasrullah announced that the chief of BAIS, Lt. Gen. Yudi Abrimantyo, no longer held that position. This followed the arrest of four officers, two from the Navy and two from the Air Force, who were assigned to BAIS and are allegedly involved in the attack.
Yet, the spokesperson did not clarify whether Yudi’s removal was linked to command responsibility, internal disciplinary measures or broader institutional considerations. The ambiguity surrounding his exit has fueled speculation about the true motives behind the move.
The TNI’s response warrants closer scrutiny. Rather than being seen as a definitive act of accountability, the dismissal of the BAIS chief has been interpreted by some observers as insufficient and potentially deflective. This concern emerges against the backdrop of the military’s expanding role in civilian domains and state-linked economic activities under the current administration. Such an expansion has renewed long-standing debates over military influence in non-defense sectors.
Nicky Fahrizal, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted that the case appears rooted in internal TNI dynamics, raising concerns over possible abuses of authority. While investigations are ongoing, the involvement of intelligence-linked personnel has intensified scrutiny of internal control mechanisms.
Civil society organizations have warned that the leadership change risks functioning as a form of cuci tangan (washing of hands), a symbolic gesture that falls short of addressing responsibility at higher levels of command. Muhammad Isnur, chair of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), argued that the resignation may obscure accountability at higher levels, including command responsibility extending to TNI leadership and even civilian authorities, particularly the defense minister. This critique shifts the focus from individual perpetrators to the broader chain of command.
At the apex of Indonesia’s military hierarchy are the TNI commander, Gen. Agus Subiyanto, and Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. The commander holds ultimate operational authority, overseeing all branches of the armed forces and strategic institutions such as BAIS. Meanwhile, the defense minister is responsible for civilian oversight, including defense policy and institutional governance.
However, this formal structure is shaped by overlapping institutional backgrounds. Both Prabowo and Sjafrie are former senior military figures, creating a leadership environment closely intertwined with the TNI. This convergence produces a highly interconnected system in which military intelligence, command authority and political leadership meet at the top, making decisions such as the removal of the BAIS chief not merely administrative, but embedded within broader dynamics of power, loyalty and control.
