Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
Latest News
Pos Indonesia, the country's oldest state-owned enterprise (SOE), has come under renewed scrutiny following the resignation of its president director, Daud Joseph, after only three months in office. His departure was followed by allegations of governance irregularities, including suspected manipulation of the company's financial statements, prompting state asset fund Danantara to launch an audit. The episode underscores the persistent weaknesses in SOE governance that have contributed to the sector's underperformance for years.
Joseph was appointed president director on March 11 after previously serving as operations and safety director at Transjakarta. He filled a leadership vacancy that had been occupied by an acting president director for nearly a year. On June 22, however, Joseph resigned, saying Pos Indonesia required a leader with more specialized expertise to carry out the company's transformation.
His resignation came amid a sharp deterioration in the company's financial performance. Pos Indonesia's revenue fell by 20 percent in 2025, declining from Rp 5.02 trillion (US$286 million) to Rp 3.97 trillion. This was well below the company's five-year average revenue of Rp 5.06 trillion and marked its lowest annual revenue since 2013. Consequently, gross profit declined to Rp 1.5 trillion.
The decline was driven partly by lower logistics revenue from government social assistance distribution programs, including cash, rice and food aid, which fell to only Rp 300 billion. Beyond government-related services, Pos Indonesia also recorded weaker revenue from its logistics, courier and property businesses. By the first half of 2025, the parent company had posted an operating loss of Rp 37.92 billion. Operating cash flow also remained under pressure, with a negative balance of Rp 677.52 billion, extending a trend that began in 2024.
Beyond its weakening financial performance, governance failures have created additional risks for the company. In June 2025, Pos Indonesia disclosed estimated losses of Rp 37.73 billion resulting from employee fraud, up from Rp 34.49 billion estimated at the end of 2024. Around half of the estimated losses originated from the company's Makassar regional office. These figures remain subject to an ongoing audit as investigators examine misconduct that accumulated over several years.
Employee fraud has repeatedly surfaced within Pos Indonesia, ranging from the misappropriation of social assistance funds to broader operational misconduct. Last month, authorities arrested a fugitive linked to corruption in the distribution of funds under the Family Hope Program (PKH) in Cirebon, a case that caused state losses of Rp 264.55 million. Another corruption case in Bengkulu involved the misuse of stamp duty revenue and pension funds between 2022 and 2024, resulting in estimated state losses of around Rp 3 billion.
These recurring governance failures stand in stark contrast to Pos Indonesia's financial recovery after 2019. The company successfully reversed a comprehensive net loss of Rp 104.38 billion in 2019 into a comprehensive net profit of Rp 839 billion in 2024. However, the downturn appears to have resumed, with comprehensive net income reaching only Rp 144.74 billion in the first half of 2025.
The combination of deteriorating financial performance and suspected governance failures has prompted Danantara to intervene. The sovereign wealth fund plans to appoint a new management team to restore Pos Indonesia as a financially healthy, professionally managed and accountable company. Since its establishment, Danantara has consistently emphasized improving governance standards across SOEs by strengthening financial reporting and enforcing accountability for misconduct.
Nevertheless, the impact of these reforms has yet to become evident. Several major SOEs, including MIND ID and Telkom Indonesia, reported weaker financial performance in 2025. Questions have also emerged over Danantara's own reporting practices. For example, Danantara reported Bank Rakyat Indonesia's (BRI) profit at Rp 21.2 trillion for the first four months of this year, while the bank's official financial statements recorded net profit of Rp 15.9 trillion, raising concerns about data consistency and transparency.
The problems at Pos Indonesia should therefore not be viewed as an isolated corporate failure, but as a reflection of longstanding structural weaknesses in Indonesia's SOE governance framework. Unless these underlying issues are addressed, governance reforms under Danantara are unlikely to deliver lasting improvements in SOE performance.
