Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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The corruption scandal engulfing the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) has significantly amplified public skepticism toward President Prabowo Subianto’s flagship free nutritious meal program. What began as policy criticism has since escalated into street protests.
By late June 2026, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) had named six suspects in an alleged graft case involving the governance of the program for the 2025–2026 fiscal years. The suspects include three former senior BGN officials, alongside Asep Yusuf Somantri, a close associate of former BGN deputy head Sony Sonjaya; Andri Mulyono, a commissioner at PT Yasa Artha Trimanunggal; and Glory Harimas Sihombing, chairman of the Indonesia Food Security Review Foundation.
The investigation deepened when Sonjaya reportedly disclosed 41 names allegedly involved in the illicit trading of Nutrition Fulfillment Service Unit (SPPG) locations. While Sonjaya sought justice collaborator status, prosecutors rejected the request, arguing that he functioned as a principal actor rather than a secondary participant capable of exposing higher-ranking figures. Meanwhile, the AGO has left open the possibility of questioning the newly appointed BGN head, Naniek S. Deyang. Because Deyang previously served as the agency's deputy head, her promotion has drawn sharp scrutiny from observers who argue that promises of institutional reform ring hollow when leadership changes amount to little more than an internal reshuffle.
Constitutional review petitions challenging the diversion of education funds for the free meals program are currently being examined by the Constitutional Court. Chief Justice Suhartoyo indicated that the court aims to conclude its review of the three petitions by the end of June, with formal rulings expected in July. This judicial process will be pivotal, not only for determining the legitimacy of this specific funding mechanism but also for clarifying the limits of executive discretion over constitutionally protected public resources.
As these legal battles unfold, public opposition on the ground has intensified. Dissatisfaction has manifested in a wave of nationwide demonstrations, accompanied by broader criticism of President Prabowo's governing style, which protesters link to contemporary economic hardships. This unrest has mobilized diverse coalitions of students, women's groups and civil society members across major urban centers, including Makassar, South Sulawesi; Denpasar, Bali; Bandung, West Java; Semarang, Central Java; and Jakarta.
Political researchers argue that this widespread friction cannot be uncoupled from perceptions of an increasingly centralized, top-down governance model. The fact that dissent now extends well beyond traditional student movements suggests that concerns over the program are no longer confined to political activists, but are resonating deeply at the grassroots level.
Conversely, a distinct counter-mobilization has surfaced. Employees and operators of the SPPGs recently rallied near the National Monument in Jakarta to voice their support for the initiative. Teachers, students, kitchen staff and service unit owners participated in the demonstration, emphasizing the program's tangible nutritional benefits and demanding its uninterrupted continuation.
However, political observers caution against interpreting these pro-program rallies as entirely spontaneous expressions of public goodwill. Governments facing crises of legitimacy have historically relied on structured counter-narratives and organized support bases to reshape public perception.
The timing of these pro-free meals demonstrations is also telling, coinciding with the BGN's decision to temporarily suspend the program during the 18-day school vacation period. During this hiatus, SPPG operators forfeit the Rp 6 million (US$335) daily operational incentives typically provided by the government.
Even if support for the continuation of the program is entirely authentic, it is heavily viewed through the lens of economic self-interest. This shifts the broader debate surrounding who truly represents the program’s rightful beneficiaries. While the initiative was originally designed to improve childhood nutrition and elevate educational outcomes, the controversy has increasingly centered on the commercial actors embedded within its implementation chain.
