Sector

Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

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Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.

Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.

Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.

Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.

As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.

Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.

Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.

Latest News

June 11, 2026

Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s "safari politik" (campaign tour) since June marks a significant turning point in Indonesia’s post-presidential politics. Although publicly framed as a series of visits to fulfil invitations and meet citizens, the former presidents tour reflects a calculated effort to sustain influence, reorganize political alliances and shape the country’s political future toward the 2029 elections. Rather than a purely symbolic return, the "safari politik" represents a strategic repositioning in a political landscape now led by President Prabowo Subianto.

After completing his presidency in October 2024, Jokowi entered a quieter phase, though he remained highly popular among the public. By late May 2026, he announced plans to travel across Indonesia, beginning with Lampung, East Nusa Tenggara Timur and West Java provinces, after recovering from health issues.

Officially, Jokowi described the visits as responses to invitations from local communities and efforts to maintain social ties. However, the scale of the tour and its timing highlight a broader political context. Jokowi is no longer aligned with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the party that supported his presidency from 2014 to 2024, and is increasingly associated with the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), led by his son Kaesang Pangarep.

Jokowi’s safari serves several interconnected goals. First, it is a demonstration of continued political relevance. By visiting multiple regions and mobilizing public enthusiasm, Jokowi signals that his popularity remains strong even after leaving office. Analysts view this as a message to political elites, including Prabowo, that Jokowi still commands a significant grassroots base.

Second, the "safari politik" is widely seen as a strategy to strengthen PSI. Observers argue that Jokowi is leveraging his popularity to boost the party’s electability and potentially help it pass the parliamentary threshold. Since PSI lacks a strong nationwide structure, Jokowi’s personal appeal becomes its most valuable political asset.

Third, the tour reflects a long-term political calculation toward 2029. Analysts suggest Jokowi is maintaining bargaining power in coalition politics while positioning his political network for future competition. This includes indirectly supporting the political trajectory of his son, Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

Finally, the tour continues Jokowi’s signature blusukan-style engagement, but with a clearer electoral and organizational purpose. It is no longer just about connecting with citizens, it is also about mobilizing supporters and consolidating networks.

The safari provides Jokowi with several strategic opportunities. First, it allows him to maintain national visibility and relevance. Former presidents often lose political influence over time, but Jokowi’s continued presence helps preserve his role as a key political figure and potential kingmaker.

Second, the tour supports his effort to build PSI as a viable political force. By directly engaging with local cadres and communities, Jokowi can help transform the party from a marginal player into a more competitive organization, benefiting from the “coattail effect” of his popularity.

Third, the safari acts as a test of political loyalty. By observing the level of public participation and support, Jokowi can assess whether his influence remains strong outside formal office.

Fourth, it helps him consolidate and expand his support base geographically. By revisiting regions that supported him during past elections, Jokowi strengthens existing networks while potentially reaching new voters. Together, these gains reinforce Jokowi’s position as an influential actor in Indonesia’s political system despite no longer holding power.

For PDI-P, Jokowi’s "safari politik" has significant implications. Symbolically, it confirms the breakdown of Jokowi’s relationship with his old party PDI-P. His growing association with PSI weakens PDI-P’s ability to claim his achievements and legacy as part of its political identity. Strategically, the safari could erode PDI-P’s voter base. Many voters identify more strongly with Jokowi as an individual than with party structures. If Jokowi successfully mobilizes these supporters under PSI, PDI-P risks losing influence in key regions.

Jokowi’s safari also affects President Prabowo’s political environment. On one hand, Jokowi’s engagement may benefit political stability. His high popularity can help maintain public confidence and support for the broader political system. On the other hand, it introduces a form of parallel political influence. By maintaining his own network of supporters, Jokowi ensures that he remains a key figure whose interests cannot be ignored.

Analysts interpret "safari politik" as a signal to Prabowo that Jokowi retains significant leverage in Indonesian politics. Moreover, Jokowi’s efforts to strengthen PSI could alter future coalition dynamics. A more competitive PSI may influence alliances and reshape the balance of power as Indonesia approaches the 2029 elections.

Jokowi’s June 2026 "safari politik" is not merely a routine tour, it is a strategic effort to preserve influence, build a new political base, and shape Indonesia’s political future.

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