Sector

Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

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Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.

Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.

Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.

Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.

As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.

Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.

Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.

Latest News

April 9, 2026

Three weeks after the acid attack on Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Kontras) activist Andrie Yunus, investigators have yet to clearly identify who bears ultimate responsibility. What has drawn particular attention is the resignation of the chief of the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), framed by the Indonesian Military (TNI) as a form of institutional accountability. Yet, this raises the critical question of whether the move reflects genuine responsibility-taking by the state or signals deeper power struggles within the military.

On the evening of March 12, Andrie Yunus, an activist with Kontras, was attacked with acid while riding home in Central Jakarta. Earlier that day, he recorded a podcast discussing the military’s role in politics. The timing has sharpened concerns about possible links between his advocacy work and the assault.

As of April 1, Andrie remained in the high-care unit at Cipto Mangunkusumo General Hospital (RSCM). He is undergoing intensive treatment, particularly for his eyes, as residual acid exposure has complicated medical assessments and may result in permanent damage. Kontras has described his condition as critical.

President Prabowo Subianto has condemned the attack and pledged that investigators will pursue not only the perpetrators on the ground but also the “highest actors” behind it. He emphasized the need to uncover “who ordered and paid for” the crime and has floated the possibility of establishing an independent fact-finding team.

However, this firm stance unfolds within a layered historical context. As widely documented, Prabowo himself faced allegations of human rights abuses during his military career. While he was never tried in court, he was dismissed from the TNI in 1998 for insubordination. This juxtaposition, between past controversies and present commitments to justice, adds a layer of political complexity to the case.

On March 25, TNI spokesperson Maj. Gen. Aulia Dwi Nasrullah announced that the chief of BAIS, Lt. Gen. Yudi Abrimantyo, no longer held that position. This followed the arrest of four officers, two from the Navy and two from the Air Force, who were assigned to BAIS and are allegedly involved in the attack.

Yet, the spokesperson did not clarify whether Yudi’s removal was linked to command responsibility, internal disciplinary measures or broader institutional considerations. The ambiguity surrounding his exit has fueled speculation about the true motives behind the move.

The TNI’s response warrants closer scrutiny. Rather than being seen as a definitive act of accountability, the dismissal of the BAIS chief has been interpreted by some observers as insufficient and potentially deflective. This concern emerges against the backdrop of the military’s expanding role in civilian domains and state-linked economic activities under the current administration. Such an expansion has renewed long-standing debates over military influence in non-defense sectors.

Nicky Fahrizal, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted that the case appears rooted in internal TNI dynamics, raising concerns over possible abuses of authority. While investigations are ongoing, the involvement of intelligence-linked personnel has intensified scrutiny of internal control mechanisms.

Civil society organizations have warned that the leadership change risks functioning as a form of cuci tangan (washing of hands), a symbolic gesture that falls short of addressing responsibility at higher levels of command. Muhammad Isnur, chair of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), argued that the resignation may obscure accountability at higher levels, including command responsibility extending to TNI leadership and even civilian authorities, particularly the defense minister. This critique shifts the focus from individual perpetrators to the broader chain of command.

At the apex of Indonesia’s military hierarchy are the TNI commander, Gen. Agus Subiyanto, and Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. The commander holds ultimate operational authority, overseeing all branches of the armed forces and strategic institutions such as BAIS. Meanwhile, the defense minister is responsible for civilian oversight, including defense policy and institutional governance.

However, this formal structure is shaped by overlapping institutional backgrounds. Both Prabowo and Sjafrie are former senior military figures, creating a leadership environment closely intertwined with the TNI. This convergence produces a highly interconnected system in which military intelligence, command authority and political leadership meet at the top, making decisions such as the removal of the BAIS chief not merely administrative, but embedded within broader dynamics of power, loyalty and control.

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