Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono's recent political messaging can be interpreted as an attempt to achieve a delicate balancing act: positioning himself and the Democratic Party as a critical voice within government without crossing the line into outright opposition. It is a strategy born from both opportunity and necessity. For Agus, the political challenge is obvious. While he remains one of Indonesia's most recognizable younger politicians, he has not consistently appeared among the top-tier contenders in most discussions about the 2029 presidential election.
The dominant attention has largely been focused on figures with stronger executive credentials, deeper political machines or higher public popularity. If Agus hopes to become a serious presidential contender, maintaining the status quo is not enough. He needs greater visibility, a more distinct political identity and a narrative that separates him from the many parties supporting the government.
This helps explain the significance of his speech. Rather than offering unconditional praise for the administration, Agus appeared to emphasize themes of accountability, governance and the need for those in power to remain responsive to public concerns. The message was notable not because it represented a complete break from the government, but because it subtly challenged the perception that coalition parties must always defend the administration's every move.
The strategy serves multiple purposes. First, it allows the Democrats to reclaim part of their traditional identity as a centrist reformist party. Since joining the governing coalition, the party has enjoyed access to government but has also risked losing its distinctiveness. In a broad coalition dominated by larger political forces, smaller parties can easily become politically invisible. By adopting a more critical tone, the Democrats can remind voters that it possesses an independent voice.
Second, it helps 48-year old Agus personally. Indonesian presidential politics tends to reward leaders who appear decisive and independent rather than excessively dependent on existing power structures. If Agus is perceived merely as another coalition politician benefiting from office, his appeal may remain limited. If he can present himself as a leader willing to speak uncomfortable truths while still acting responsibly, his profile could improve significantly ahead of 2029.
The danger for Agus is that repeated efforts to distinguish himself could eventually be interpreted by coalition partners as positioning for a future campaign at their expense. If that perception grows, the Democratic Party could find itself marginalized in decision-making, deprived of influence or ultimately pushed toward the political sidelines. Even without formal expulsion from the coalition, a party can become isolated and lose much of the practical advantage that comes from being part of government.
Yet political history suggests that such an outcome may not necessarily be disastrous. The most relevant example comes from Agus’ own father, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). During the administration of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, SBY served as coordinating minister for political and security affairs. As tensions emerged between him and elements within the government, he increasingly appeared marginalized. His resignation and departure from the cabinet were widely interpreted as signs of political isolation.
At the time, many viewed that isolation as a setback. Instead, it became a turning point. SBY successfully transformed himself into an alternative to the incumbent establishment. By portraying himself as a capable insider who was nevertheless willing to challenge the status quo, he appealed to voters seeking change without revolutionary disruption. In the 2004 presidential election, he defeated Megawati and became Indonesia's first directly elected president.
The parallel is not exact. The political environment of 2029 will differ significantly from that of 2004. SBY entered the race with substantial public popularity, military credentials and a national profile developed through years of government service. Agus has yet to achieve a similar level of political strength. Furthermore, Indonesia's party system today is more fragmented and coalition-based than it was two decades ago.
Nevertheless, the historical lesson remains relevant. Being pushed away from power is not always politically damaging. In some circumstances, it can become a political asset if it allows a leader to embody both experience and independence. This may ultimately be the calculation behind Agus’ approach. The ideal scenario is to gain the benefits of both worlds: remain inside the governing coalition, enjoy access to executive power and simultaneously cultivate an image as a principled critic. That would increase his visibility without sacrificing influence.
The problem is that such a balance is extremely difficult to maintain. For Agus, the coming years may therefore be defined by a central political question: can he successfully become Indonesia's most prominent "critical insider," or will his attempt to create distance from power eventually force him to choose between government influence and opposition credibility?
