Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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The rupiah recently plunged to an all-time low of Rp 17,514 per United States dollar, and pressure on the currency may intensify in the second quarter as Indonesia faces a convergence of external and domestic challenges. Maturing government debt, dividend repatriation by foreign investors and soaring oil prices are tightening dollar liquidity, while the latest MSCI Indonesia rebalancing threatens further capital outflows.
Both the central bank and the government have made concerted efforts to defend the rupiah, but so far to little avail. The currency’s persistent weakness increasingly reflects not only deteriorating fundamentals, but also eroding market confidence in the consistency of economic policymaking.
Bank Indonesia has introduced several stabilization measures, including large-scale foreign exchange intervention, efforts to attract foreign capital through Bank Indonesia Securities (SRBI), purchases of government securities (SBN) on the secondary market, loose liquidity conditions in the market and banking sector, increased intervention in the non-deliverable forward (NDF) market, restrictions on dollar purchases to a maximum of US$25,000 per person per month and closer monitoring of dollar transactions.
The government has also joined Bank Indonesia in defending the rupiah by introducing a Bond Stabilization Fund (BSF), a mechanism to buy back government bonds during periods of market stress using excess budget balances (SAL). Yet these measures have so far failed to arrest the rupiah’s decline.
The rupiah has weakened steadily against major currencies, including the US dollar, Singapore dollar, euro and Australian dollar, since last year. Year-to-date, the rupiah has depreciated by around 5 percent, while regional peers such as the Singapore dollar, Brunei dollar and Malaysian ringgit have appreciated. Domestically, the currency’s weakness cannot be separated from rising inflationary pressure and rapid money supply expansion. In April 2026, base money growth reached 14.6 percent year-on-year, significantly higher than the single-digit growth recorded a year earlier.
The second quarter has historically been vulnerable due to seasonal dividend repatriation, when multinational companies convert rupiah earnings into foreign currency. This year, however, the pressure is amplified by around Rp 30 trillion ($1.7 billion) in maturing government securities. At the same time, the government faces a swelling subsidy burden as oil and gas prices surge following the prolonged conflict between the US and Iran.
Energy subsidy and compensation spending in the first quarter jumped 266.5 percent year-on-year to Rp 118.7 trillion, equivalent to 26.6 percent of the 2026 State Budget allocation. With oil prices remaining elevated, fiscal pressure is expected to worsen. Exchange rate depreciation also places additional strain on state-owned enterprises such as PT Pertamina and PLN, both of which carry significant foreign exchange exposure.
Pressure is also coming from the capital market. In February 2026, MSCI warned that Indonesia risked being downgraded from emerging-market to frontier-market status due to concerns over market governance and liquidity. Indonesia ultimately retained its emerging-market status after reforms introduced by the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Financial Services Authority, but MSCI removed many Indonesian stocks from its indices.
Six stocks were removed from the MSCI Global Standard Index and 13 from the MSCI Global Small Cap Index, with no new additions. Several companies were excluded because their ownership structures were deemed too concentrated, raising concerns over limited liquidity and potential price control by conglomerates as majority shareholders.
MSCI’s decision has pushed the composite index down from above 9,000 in January to below 6,800. Foreign capital outflows have intensified accordingly. In the first quarter alone, equity outflows reached $1.95 billion, followed by another $280 million in the second quarter through May 2026. Analysts estimate that MSCI rebalancing alone could trigger passive outflows of Rp 28 trillion to Rp 31 trillion — equivalent to roughly 1 percent of Indonesia’s foreign exchange reserves.
As a small open economy, Indonesia remains highly vulnerable to shifts in global risk appetite. The rupiah’s movement is influenced not only by domestic fundamentals, but also by geopolitical tensions, commodity prices and investor sentiment toward emerging markets.
Yet market sentiment toward Indonesia continues to weaken. Since February, both Moody’s and Fitch Ratings have revised Indonesia’s outlook from stable to negative, reflecting concerns over fiscal sustainability, policy credibility and governance risks.
The weakening rupiah should not be dismissed as temporary volatility. Exchange rates, bond yields and capital flows reflect the collective judgment of financial markets on the direction of an economy. Behind the headline GDP figures, Indonesia’s underlying economic condition remains fragile. Household consumption growth has stagnated over the past year, while gross national product (GNP), which better reflects income generated by Indonesian residents and businesses, has not expanded as strongly as GDP.
Without meaningful structural reforms, investor confidence could deteriorate further. Inconsistent policy direction, aggressive monetary expansion and weak law enforcement risk undermining the macroeconomic stability Indonesia has maintained since the 1998 Asian financial crisis. Sustaining long-term growth will depend not only on fiscal intervention, but also on restoring trust in the country’s economic management.
