Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation as vice president marks a turning point, not only for his own career but for the balance of power within Indonesia’s governing elite. With his resignation letter delivered to President Prabowo Subianto on Nov. 11, the drama over his future appears to have entered its final phase.
The resignation is not yet legally complete, but the remaining steps are largely constitutional formalities. The president must forward the letter to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which must endorse it and then begin selecting a new vice president. The more consequential question is no longer whether Gibran stays, but what his departure means for Indonesian politics.
The resignation does not necessarily end efforts in the House of Representatives to pursue the “right to express opinion” (HMP) process on his impeachment. Proponents have strong incentives to continue. Doing so would put Gibran’s removal beyond dispute, whether through resignation or formal constitutional judgement, and would let legislators establish a political and constitutional record of the events behind the crisis. For his opponents, resignation may not be enough; they may want a definitive MPR repudiation of his legitimacy.
Yet the significance extends well beyond one officeholder. Gibran’s vice presidency was never merely a constitutional post. He was the most visible and institutionalized link between Prabowo and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s seventh president, who served from 2014 to 2024, and Gibran’s father. Through Gibran, Jokowi kept direct influence inside the administration after leaving office, and his political network retained representation at the highest level, sustaining the appearance of a joint enterprise forged in the 2024 election.
That arrangement has now been fundamentally weakened. Gibran’s departure removes Jokowi’s most important institutional foothold in government. Prabowo holds the authority of office, control of the state apparatus and a large coalition in the legislature, while Jokowi becomes increasingly dependent on informal networks. The relationship has been evolving for some time, but the resignation accelerates the shift from a shared arrangement to a government unmistakably centered on Prabowo.
Many political actors have already recognized this. Three senior figures reportedly left the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) while keeping their cabinet posts, further reducing Jokowi’s leverage. The PSI has often been viewed as his political vehicle, particularly since he left office, so their decision reads as a declaration that loyalty to the President now outranks loyalty to the party. In politics, loyalty tends to follow power, and the drift toward the presidential center reflects an emerging consensus that Indonesia’s political future revolves around Prabowo rather than Jokowi. Gibran’s resignation reinforces that perception by removing one of the principal symbols of Jokowi’s continuing influence.
Ironically, Gibran may have done the governing coalition a favor. Had he stayed and fought the allegations, Indonesia could have faced months of political warfare. An impeachment would almost certainly have been ugly, prolonged and divisive: coalition parties forced to take sides, ministers pressured to defend or abandon the Vice President, and hearings and constitutional arguments dominating the national agenda. Prabowo would have been trapped between defending his elected running mate and protecting his administration’s credibility, while the opposition gained a powerful platform.
By stepping aside, Gibran has greatly reduced the likelihood of that scenario. The constitutional machinery may keep moving, but a drawn-out battle now looks far less likely. The greatest casualty, however, is likely to be Gibran himself. Before this crisis he was widely seen as a plausible 2029 presidential contender. As the son of a popular former president and a sitting vice president, he naturally invited such speculation. Recent months have dramatically altered that trajectory.
He has said he will keep defending himself through legal channels, notably before the State Administrative Court (PTUN). A favorable ruling on the educational credential controversy could let him argue he was unfairly targeted and restore some personal credibility. But a legal victory is not a political revival. Legitimacy is shaped by public perception, collective memory and political narrative, not by courts alone. Even complete vindication would not erase voters’ memories of the controversy over the Constitutional Court decision that enabled his candidacy, or the later disputes over his qualifications.
Indonesia has seen political comebacks, Prabowo’s being a prime example, but they require reinvention, time and a compelling new story. Gibran would be attempting one where the central issue is the legitimacy of his own rise. A serious 2029 candidacy therefore now looks remote.
Ultimately, the larger implications may concern his father. For more than a decade Jokowi dominated Indonesian politics, but influence after leaving office depends on institutions, networks and successors, and all three now appear under pressure. Gibran is leaving the vice presidency, the PSI looks increasingly fragile as a vehicle, elites are reorienting toward Prabowo, and controversies around figures long associated with Jokowi raise questions about his network’s durability.
None of this means Jokowi has ceased to matter. He remains one of Indonesia’s most influential figures and commands substantial public support. But can he shape outcomes without a successor in office? Can the PSI stay relevant without access to power? Can he remain a kingmaker in a landscape increasingly dominated by Prabowo? Those questions remain open. What is clearer is that Gibran’s resignation may be remembered less as the fall of a vice president than as the decisive moment in the transition from the Jokowi era to a fully Prabowo-centered political order.
