Sector

Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

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Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.

Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.

Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.

Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.

As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.

Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.

Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.

Latest News

June 9, 2026

The more than 50 overseas trips President Prabowo Subianto has taken during less than two years in office have increasingly drawn public skepticism. Critics question whether the frequency of these trips aligns with genuine diplomatic priorities and the administration's stated commitment to fiscal efficiency. Thus far, the government's defense has been less than satisfying.

On June 1, Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya addressed the mounting censure, saying in a video statement that any expenses exceeding official state budget allocations were personally covered by the President. Teddy also emphasized that strict cost-efficiency measures had been implemented, including cutting the size of the presidential entourage roughly in half compared to previous administrations.

However, his statement also included a pointed rebuttal aimed at Dino Patti Djalal, the founder of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) who previously served as deputy foreign minister and ambassador to the United States. Days earlier via Instagram on May 30, Dino questioned the frequency of Prabowo’s trips and suggested teleconferencing or delegating certain engagements to Foreign Minister Sugiono as viable alternatives.

This is merely the latest flash point in a broader debate over presidential trips that has been simmering for months. Earlier this year, public scrutiny focused on Prabowo’s alleged use of multiple state aircraft for foreign trips. This prompted Teddy to clarify on Feb. 3 that reports of the President utilizing two state planes at the same time were inaccurate, against insisting that the size of his entourage had been significantly reduced.

While international diplomacy is an essential tool of statecraft, public apprehension is not necessarily directed at the idea of foreign trips but rather at their scale, timing and measurable outcomes. Three core issues drive these concerns.

First, the sheer frequency of the President’s overseas trips stands out against historical precedents. Dino estimated that Prabowo had spent roughly one out of every six days abroad since assuming office in October 2024. In actual numbers, the President has made more than 50 overseas trips, including seven in late 2024, beginning with a state visit to Beijing to meet President Xi Jinping, 34 in 2025 and around eight in the first half of this year, the most recent a trip to Paris from May 26 to 29.

A politician from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party even said the President had planned to extend the most recent journey to Austria and Hungary, but the President’s office has denied this. Nevertheless, the relentless pace of his overseas trips invites a question about return on investment.

Second, these extensive itineraries for the purposes of diplomacy clash with the government-wide mandate for fiscal prudence and discipline. Prabowo has repeatedly instructed his cabinet as well as state agencies to boost efficiency and curb spending, including on official trips. Meanwhile, the government keeps its budget for presidential trips hidden, though independent estimates place the cost per trip at between Rp 3 billion (US$166,000) and Rp 15 billion, depending on distance and duration.

Against this backdrop, the President’s frequent overseas trips risk creating a severe perception gap, particularly when their objectives remain opaque. France is a case in point. Prabowo has visited the country four times less than two years into his presidency, prompting observers to question whether they entailed any concrete outcomes. Mohamad Guntur Romli of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) criticized the government's characterization of the latest Paris trip as a triumph, noting it received scant coverage in major French media.

The issue of optics was exacerbated by viral social media chatter surrounding Teddy's birthday celebration at a luxury Paris hotel during the penultimate visit in mid-April. Regardless of who footed the bill, that image reinforced public perceptions of an elite detached from prevailing anxieties over belt-tightening and the swelling budget deficit.

Third, transparency remains a critical blind spot. Statecraft is not merely about announcing itineraries, signing symbolic memorandums of understanding or posing for photo ops. It requires ensuring that citizens understand the tangible benefits of international engagements, including clear accounting of expenditures.

Several political analysts and officials have echoed this demand. The PDI-P’s Andreas Hugo Pareira argued that the administration must provide clearer benchmarks and targets for the President’s foreign trips. Misbah Hasan, secretary-general of the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (FITRA), has similarly called for rigid oversight, including potential auditing by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), to restore and maintain public trust.

Finally, the debate is not about anchoring the President in Jakarta. The real issue at hand is whether the government can convincingly prove to the people that the scale and frequency of these trips are proportionate to their rewards. The success of diplomatic engagement must be measured not by the mileage accumulated but by the transparency, strategic value and tangible dividends delivered to the public, especially in a time of crisis like today.

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