Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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The provisions in the Indonesia-United States Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) have once again drawn public scrutiny. This time, the debate extends beyond tariff reductions to a more sensitive issue: the possible easing of halal certification requirements for US products entering the Indonesian market.
As stipulated in the ART, several US products such as cosmetics and medical devices are recorded as receiving certain facilities related to halal certification. The agreement also mentions recognition of US slaughtering standards and food safety supervision systems for food and agricultural products.
Specifically, the ART stipulates that Indonesia will allow any US halal certifier recognized by Indonesia’s halal authority, such as the Halal Transactions of Omaha (HTO) and the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA), to certify products for importation without additional requirements or restrictions. In addition, Indonesia will streamline and accelerate recognition of US halal certifiers.
For the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, however, halal certification is not merely an administrative requirement but a central pillar of consumer protection. Under Law No. 33/2014 on halal product assurance, goods entering and distributed in Indonesia must be halal certified unless they are explicitly declared non-halal. In theory, imported US products could simply be labeled and sold as non-halal.
However, the more pressing concern is the lack of clarity on how the policy would be implemented. Without detailed guidelines from the government, the uncertainty surrounding this issue has fueled speculation about whether this would amount to a limited administrative adjustment or a broader relaxation of the national halal assurance framework.
At present, domestically distributed products are generally expected to be halal certified. Retail outlets specializing in non-halal goods remain the exception rather than the norm. In practice, businesses seeking broad market access must obtain halal certification through the Halal Certification Agency (BPJPH), meaning that this is not just a formal requirement but effectively a gateway for mass-market domestic distribution.
In essence, the debate now centers on two fundamental concerns. The first is consumer protection. From the perspective of foreign exporters, mandatory halal certification is often framed as a nontariff barrier that discriminates against imported goods. Yet in the domestic context, halal assurance is less about trade restrictions and more about safeguarding the religious freedoms of Indonesia’s Muslim majority.
In a country where the overwhelming share of consumers requires halal products for daily consumption, consumer protection cannot be treated as religiously neutral. It is inherently tied to ensuring that Muslim consumers can participate in the market without doubts or ambiguities regarding what they consume. Removing or diluting halal certification requirements, even selectively, risks shifting the burden of product assurance from the state to individual consumers.
The second issue is regulatory sovereignty. Halal certification is embedded in Indonesia’s legal and institutional frameworks. Accepting foreign standards in lieu of domestic certification would not simply streamline procedures; it could also signal a partial transfer of regulatory authority. Recognition of US slaughtering or food safety standards without full alignment with Indonesia’s halal assurance mechanisms may be interpreted as subordinating domestic rules to external systems. Over time, this could weaken the state’s control over how religious compliance is defined, audited and enforced within its own territory.
Taken together, these concerns illustrate why the ART provisions have generated sensitivity beyond typical trade negotiations. The issue is not solely about tariffs or technical facilitation but also about how Indonesia balances trade liberalization with its responsibility to protect consumers and maintain regulatory autonomy. In a matter as closely tied to religion, identity and public trust as halal certification, even incremental policy adjustments can carry implications that extend well beyond commerce.
