Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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Strengthening national defense has long been a priority for President Prabowo Subianto and dates back to his tenure as defense minister. There is no doubt about his administration’s focus on defense, given that the country has yet to achieve its 2009-2024 Minimum Essential Force (MEF) target. Yet the public continues to question whether the government’s efforts are genuinely aimed at safeguarding Indonesia’s sovereignty or attempts to extend military authority into civilian domains.
Defense spending has remained relatively high despite the administration’s budget efficiency policy. This year, the Defense Ministry received a whopping Rp 187.1 trillion (US$10.5 billion) from the state budget, making defense the second largest expenditure after the free nutritious meal program. The 2026 defense budget reflects a steady increase over the past five years. According to the Central Government Financial Report (LKPP), the Defense Ministry had a budget of Rp 125.9 trillion in 2021. This had grown to Rp 190.5 trillion by 2024, and its estimated realization stood at Rp 247.5 trillion for 2025.
As a symbolic demonstration of this defense strengthening strategy, on May 18 President Prabowo handed over six Rafale fighter jets, four Dassault Falcon 8X, one Thales mobile long-range radar and one Airbus A400M Atlas military transport aircraft to Indonesian Military (TNI) commander Gen. Agus Subiyanto during a ceremony at the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base in East Jakarta. The handover came four years after Indonesia signed an $8.1 billion procurement agreement with France for 42 Rafale fighter jets, when Prabowo was defense minister.
Despite these historic hikes in nominal spending, Indonesia's defense budget remains chronically constrained when measured against total economic output, hovering at below 0.8 percent of gross domestic product. This lags considerably behind regional peers such as Singapore and Vietnam. This funding shortfall makes the military's expansion into nonconventional roles in domestic affairs particularly controversial, raising concerns among critics who view it as reminiscent of the New Order era, when the military controlled both the social and political spheres.
One notable example of this military shift is the government’s commitment to establish "territorial development battalions" across the country’s 514 regencies and municipalities. As of April, 155 of these battalions had been established. This initiative also has necessitated a significant increase in military recruitment, with around 24,000 enlisted soldiers (tamtama) to serve primarily in noncombat roles. The new battalions are tasked with supporting flagship government initiatives, including the free meals program, the Red and White Cooperatives, food security programs and local infrastructure development.
During a meeting on May 19 with House of Representatives Commission I, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said the members of territorial development battalions would also contribute to the social and religious life of surrounding communities. He explained that each battalion of approximately 1,190 troops included recruits with diverse backgrounds, from graduates of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) to individuals trained in interfaith services.
Military involvement in civilian affairs is also creeping into local law enforcement. During a press conference at the Jakarta Police headquarters on May 22, authorities announced that the Jakarta Military Command would be actively involved in hunting down gangs of begal (street robbers) that were spreading fear across Greater Jakarta. While this might appear to be decisive response to public anxiety, mobilizing the TNI in a traditional policing role risks blurring constitutional boundaries and increasing potential human rights abuses.
Furthermore, the TNI is expected to extend its influence into higher education through the Finance Ministry’s Education Endowment Fund (LPDP), where soldiers will reportedly help instill nationalism among scholarship recipients.
Against this backdrop, the questions surrounding the steady increase in defense spending become harder to ignore. As the TNI increasingly extends its influence on civilian affairs despite limited resources, its future trajectory has emerged not merely as a rhetorical inquiry but also as a pressing national concern.
