Sector
Energy
Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
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Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.
Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.
Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.
Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.
Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.
As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.
Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.
Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.
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The government plans to shift energy import procurement from Pertamina to the Oil and Gas Testing Center, or Lemigas, a public service agency (BLU) under the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry. The move could reshape control over the country's lucrative energy trade. The government argues that direct negotiations with supplier countries will speed up procurement, eliminate intermediaries and secure supplies, but will the new arrangement bring greater transparency and a shorter supply chain or merely add another industry player?
Coordinating Downstream and Energy Transition Minister Bahlil Lahadalia, who is concurrently the energy minister, has cited Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 107/2026 as the basis for the change. Lemigas is to procure crude oil, fuel and liquefied petroleum gas through government-to-government (G2G) or government-to-business (G2B) agreements, then sell the supplies to Pertamina.
Pertamina president director Simon Aloysius Mantiri backs the policy. Bahlil has clarified that private importers will not be required to use Lemigas. Pertamina's infrastructure remains essential for receiving, processing and distributing the imports. Purchasing decisions must therefore match refinery requirements, storage capacity and delivery schedules. Separating authority over contracts from responsibility for delivery makes coordination more important as negotiations become faster.
The same distinction between contractual changes and practical benefits applies to Bahlil's promise to eliminate "shell companies”. Intermediaries that provide financing, logistics or access to suppliers perform a different role from entities that merely add fees or conceal who benefits.
Removing a company from a contract does not eliminate its functions or the costs of replacing them. The real test is whether Lemigas can secure those services on better terms. Disclosing supplier identities, beneficial owners, selection criteria and third-party fees would make that assessment possible.
Financing illustrates why these underlying arrangements matter. Bahlil has said procurement will not draw on the state budget, without identifying an alternative source of funds. Yet these commitments leave payment obligations unexplained.
If Pertamina finances the purchases, it could bear risks from contracts negotiated elsewhere. If commercial partners provide financing, their charges and conditions must be included in procurement costs. Who pays suppliers, approves financing terms and absorbs losses will determine whether cheaper cargoes actually translate into cheaper deliveries.
The timing also deserves scrutiny.
Signed on April 30, Perpres No. 26/2026 enabled Lemigas to undertake imports. Officials initially justified the arrangement as a workaround for Pertamina's bond covenants, which complicated purchases of sanctioned Russian crude.
Its first cargo, around 770,000 barrels, arrived in late June at Lawe-Lawe, East Kalimantan, aboard a sanctioned tanker. Less than six months later, the government introduced Perpres No. 107/2026 making Lemigas the default channel for Pertamina's imports, a trade worth US$32.8 billion last year.
Yet the government has not explained whether the initial purchase delivered savings or reduced sanctions exposure, and the regulation's text was publicly unavailable when the change was announced. An exception is being expanded without a public account of whether it worked.
Will Lemigas remove a layer from the supply chain or become a new one? The center has a background in research and testing, and industry practitioner Hadi Ismoyo has questioned its trading experience.
It will need commercial partners, yet Bahlil has neither identified the companies selected to develop storage facilities nor explained how they were chosen. Perpres No. 26/2026's provision on pricing flexibility during urgent procurement makes contract scrutiny particularly important.
Removing existing traders offers little assurance of savings if replacements enter through equally opaque arrangements. The core problems remain transparency and accountability.
The government should publish the Perpres, identify partners and selection criteria, benchmark landed costs and open transactions to audit. Otherwise, the reform risks changing intermediaries while adding another contractual layer.
The government has made a case for stronger bargaining power but has yet to establish why centralizing procurement in Lemigas is the best way to exercise this.
The ministerial agency’s expanded role must justify itself through lower total costs, reliable deliveries and decisions that withstand public scrutiny. Until those benefits are demonstrated, the clearest change is who controls the contracts.
Greater state control can strengthen energy security, but only if the power to choose suppliers comes with a clear obligation to account for the results.
