Sector

Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

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Energy

Indonesia possesses vast, distributed, and diverse energy resources. The country’s energy subsectors include gas, clean water, and electricity, with demand projected to increase to 464 terawatt-hours (TWh) by 2024 and further increase to 1,885 TWh by 2060. The use of renewable energy is a top priority and the government has set ambitious goals in the General Planning for National Energy (RUEN) and General Planning for National Electricity (RKUN) to integrate 23 percent renewable energy into the national energy mix by 2025. At least US$41.8 billion of investments are needed to fully realize the goal.

Despite having a renewable energy potential estimated at around 3,000 gigawatts (GW), current utilization is merely about 12.74 GW or 3 percent. This renewable energy potential includes solar energy, which is widely spread across Indonesia, especially in East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Riau, with a potential of approximately 3,294 GW and utilization of 323 megawatts (MW). Another renewable energy, hydro energy, with a potential of 95 GW, is primarily found in North Kalimantan, Aceh, West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and Papua, with utilization reaching 6,738 MW.

Additionally, bioenergy, encompassing biofuel, biomass, and biogas, is distributed throughout Indonesia with a total potential of 57 GW and utilization of 3,118 MW. Wind energy (>6 m/s) found in East Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and Papua has a substantial potential of 155 GW, with utilization of 154 MW.

Furthermore, geothermal energy, strategically located in the “Ring of Fire” region covering Sumatra, Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Yogyakarta has a potential of 23 GW and utilization of 2,373 MW. Meanwhile, marine energy, with a potential of 63 GW, especially in Yogyakarta, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and Bali, remains untapped.

Among the renewable energy sources and their potential, these projects entail significant investments. According to the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) of the State Electricity Company (PLN), from 2021 to 2030, geothermal power plants require an investment of US$17.35 billion, large-scale solar power plants necessitate US$3.2 billion, hydropower plants require US$25.63 billion, and base renewable energy power plants require US$5.49 billion. Additionally, bioenergy power plants require an investment of US$2.2 billion, wind power plants US$1.03 billion, peaker power plants US$0.28 billion, and rooftop solar power plants IS$3 billion.

As of 2022, hydro and geothermal are the primary drivers of growth. Private entities had enhanced the capacity of hydro power by adding 603.66 MW in mini, micro, and standard hydro facilities, reaching a total of 2,459.72 MW. Meanwhile, the geothermal sector experienced a 412 MW increase over the last five years from the private sector, bringing the total capacity to 1,782.8 MW by 2022. Aside from these two renewable energy, sources solar energy has also presented significant opportunities, particularly given Indonesia's potential for floating solar systems on reservoirs and dams.

Furthermore, the country’s other national energy subsector of gas underscores Indonesia’s wealth in natural gas. Indonesia’s natural gas reserves are predominantly methane (80-95 percent), which can be used directly or processed into Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). However, demand has greatly increased over the past decade for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). From 2018 to 2022, domestic LPG production reached between 1.9 to 2 million tons, which is insufficient to meet national needs, leading to increasing imports that reached 6.74 million tons in 2022.

Currently, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry is working to attract new investments for LPG refineries through a cluster-based business scheme for the construction or future development of new LPF refineries. The ministry has identified the potential of rich gas to produce an additional 1.2 million tons of LPG cylinders domestically.

Latest News

October 13, 2026

The latest ruling by the Constitutional Court has raised far more questions than it has answered regarding the educational qualifications of Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

In a decision handed down on Oct. 6, the court noted it found no convincing evidence that Gibran possessed a foreign diploma, certificate or other credential that could legitimately serve as the foundation for an Indonesian senior high school equivalency certificate. Yet the court stopped short of annulling Gibran’s candidacy or removing him from office as the petitioners demanded.

In October 2023, the court cleared the path for the eldest son of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, then aged 36, to run for vice president the 2024 general election by ruling that the age of candidacy, set at a minimum 40 years, could be bypassed by individuals who had held an elected regional post. That controversial decision, issued by a bench led by Gibran’s uncle by marriage Anwar Usman, was followed nine days later by Gibran registering as Prabowo Subianto’s running mate. Anwar was subsequently removed as chief justice by the court's ethics council over a severe breach regarding conflict of interest.

The court determined that the petitioners lacked legal standing, precluding a hearing on the petition's merits. It further ruled that Gibran could not be unseated through an election dispute because he ceased to be a candidate the moment he was inaugurated in October 2024. Questions regarding preelection eligibility, the bench reiterated, fell under the purview of other state bodies.

The outcome ensures that this decision alone does not invalidate Gibran’s mandate. However, the legal challenge served an equally potent purpose: laying bare institutional vulnerabilities in the country’s electoral architecture. The Constitutional Court has effectively become a public forum where systemic flaws in election administration are dragged into daylight, even when it lacks the authority to correct them.

Here, the proceedings have cast serious doubt on whether the state properly enforced the most fundamental constitutional and legal requirements for an executive office. That burden of accountability now falls squarely on the General Elections Commission (KPU), the body responsible for vetting Gibran’s eligibility in the first place.

The commission maintains that it complied with existing regulations by referring to a 2019 Education and Culture Ministry certificate recognizing Gibran’s overseas schooling, alongside an accompanying decree from the ministry’s Directorate General of Higher Education. But the court’s observations reveal a glaring chasm between administrative rubber-stamping and substantive verification. As the court underscored, the administrative presumption of validity (vermoeden van rechtmatigheid) must always be grounded in accuracy and due prudence. The ruling starkly illuminated the KPU’s failure to conduct factual verification of the actual educational records underlying the ministry's certification.

This is where the issue transcends Gibran’s individual case. Election administrators are not mere paper collectors. Their core constitutional duty is to ensure that candidates meet every threshold demanded by law. When a fundamental qualification clears the vetting pipeline without its underlying documentary proof ever being verified, the credibility of the entire electoral system is compromised. Formal administrative compliance cannot serve as an excuse for failing to conduct basic due diligence on baseline qualifications. Inevitably, the controversy threatens to further erode public trust in the KPU’s capacity to oversee clean and fair elections.

The immediate question is where accountability goes from here. The House of Representatives presents one avenue. Lawmaker Deddy Sitorus from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has indicated the legislature could pursue the matter through a special committee (Pansus) or formally invoke its right of inquiry. Other factions remain noncommittal. House Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who hails from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, said while the House respected the court’s ruling, the legislature had yet to weigh in on its broader political and legal fallout.

Any legislative push, however, should not be conflated with imminent dismissal. Under Article 7B of the 1945 Constitution, unseating an incumbent president or vice president requires an onerous, multitiered process demanding the endorsement of a House plenary session, adjudication by the Constitutional Court and a final vote before the People’s Consultative Assembly.

The immediate priority is not constitutional crisis but institutional transparency. The court has delineated the limits of its authority; the test now is whether the institutions that do hold jurisdiction have the will to examine what took place before Gibran appeared on the ballot. For the KPU, that requires explaining precisely how his secondary education credentials were confirmed and demonstrating whether its vetting process met legal rigor. For the House, it means determining whether the court's revelations justify formal oversight of electoral governance and the integrity of the agencies involved.

Finally, this episode exposes a structural blind spot: A legal framework full of intricate vetting mechanisms can still prove powerless when credible eligibility disputes surface only after an official has assumed one of the highest offices in the land. The Constitutional Court’s ruling may have shut down a specific legal avenue, but it has not answered how the electoral machinery enabled the circumstances that gave rise to such a dispute in the first place. Whether the KPU and the House confront that institutional lapse or allow basic constitutional thresholds to slide will determine how much credibility remains in the vetting of the nation’s leaders.

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