Sector
Construction
As of 2022, Indonesia’s population stands at 275.8 million, a 1.17 percent growth from 272.7 million in 2021. With such a large population, Indonesia exhibits an exceptionally high demand for construction services. The total value of completed construction work in 2022 reached US$98.3 billion, with US$56.26 billion attributed to civil construction, US$32.87 billion to building construction, and the remaining US$9.17 billion to special construction work.
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As of 2022, Indonesia’s population stands at 275.8 million, a 1.17 percent growth from 272.7 million in 2021. With such a large population, Indonesia exhibits an exceptionally high demand for construction services. The total value of completed construction work in 2022 reached US$98.3 billion, with US$56.26 billion attributed to civil construction, US$32.87 billion to building construction, and the remaining US$9.17 billion to special construction work.
Subsequently, Indonesia’s construction sector has experienced accelerated growth. In 2023, its gross domestic product (GDP) reached US$133.7 billion with an annual growth rate of 4.91 percent – more than double the rate of 2022, which stood at 2.01 percent. The sector’s stable growth in 2023 is further reflected on a quarter-basis; from Q2 to Q3, the construction sector grew by 5.87 percent, and from Q3 to Q4, it grew by 5.84 percent.
The prospects of the construction sector are on the rise as the price of construction materials stabilized around 2023 following the end of the pandemic. Notably, the price index for the construction of public facilities, buildings, roads, and bridges recorded a 0.17 deflation from November to December 2023, leading to a slight deflation of 0.08 percent on the price index for construction.
The construction sector has also been seeing increasing interest from foreign investors. Throughout 2023, total foreign direct investment (FDI) that flowed into the sector reached US$281.8 million, a significant increase compared to the total FDI of US$165.3 million that the sector absorbed in 2022.
Meanwhile, the total number of construction businesses has been decreasing slightly over the years from a total of 197,030 businesses in 2022 to 190,677 businesses in 2023. Considering the rapid growth of the sector, this decrease in construction businesses is attributed more to mergers and acquisitions rather than the businesses’ ceasing operations. Additionally, it is worth noting that in 2023, the total number of Construction Labor Certificates (SKK) and registered construction expertise certificates (SKA) reached 261,720 and 38,328, respectively.
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Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation as vice president marks a turning point, not only for his own career but for the balance of power within Indonesia’s governing elite. With his resignation letter delivered to President Prabowo Subianto on Nov. 11, the drama over his future appears to have entered its final phase.
The resignation is not yet legally complete, but the remaining steps are largely constitutional formalities. The president must forward the letter to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which must endorse it and then begin selecting a new vice president. The more consequential question is no longer whether Gibran stays, but what his departure means for Indonesian politics.
The resignation does not necessarily end efforts in the House of Representatives to pursue the “right to express opinion” (HMP) process on his impeachment. Proponents have strong incentives to continue. Doing so would put Gibran’s removal beyond dispute, whether through resignation or formal constitutional judgement, and would let legislators establish a political and constitutional record of the events behind the crisis. For his opponents, resignation may not be enough; they may want a definitive MPR repudiation of his legitimacy.
Yet the significance extends well beyond one officeholder. Gibran’s vice presidency was never merely a constitutional post. He was the most visible and institutionalized link between Prabowo and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s seventh president, who served from 2014 to 2024, and Gibran’s father. Through Gibran, Jokowi kept direct influence inside the administration after leaving office, and his political network retained representation at the highest level, sustaining the appearance of a joint enterprise forged in the 2024 election.
That arrangement has now been fundamentally weakened. Gibran’s departure removes Jokowi’s most important institutional foothold in government. Prabowo holds the authority of office, control of the state apparatus and a large coalition in the legislature, while Jokowi becomes increasingly dependent on informal networks. The relationship has been evolving for some time, but the resignation accelerates the shift from a shared arrangement to a government unmistakably centered on Prabowo.
Many political actors have already recognized this. Three senior figures reportedly left the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) while keeping their cabinet posts, further reducing Jokowi’s leverage. The PSI has often been viewed as his political vehicle, particularly since he left office, so their decision reads as a declaration that loyalty to the President now outranks loyalty to the party. In politics, loyalty tends to follow power, and the drift toward the presidential center reflects an emerging consensus that Indonesia’s political future revolves around Prabowo rather than Jokowi. Gibran’s resignation reinforces that perception by removing one of the principal symbols of Jokowi’s continuing influence.
Ironically, Gibran may have done the governing coalition a favor. Had he stayed and fought the allegations, Indonesia could have faced months of political warfare. An impeachment would almost certainly have been ugly, prolonged and divisive: coalition parties forced to take sides, ministers pressured to defend or abandon the Vice President, and hearings and constitutional arguments dominating the national agenda. Prabowo would have been trapped between defending his elected running mate and protecting his administration’s credibility, while the opposition gained a powerful platform.
By stepping aside, Gibran has greatly reduced the likelihood of that scenario. The constitutional machinery may keep moving, but a drawn-out battle now looks far less likely. The greatest casualty, however, is likely to be Gibran himself. Before this crisis he was widely seen as a plausible 2029 presidential contender. As the son of a popular former president and a sitting vice president, he naturally invited such speculation. Recent months have dramatically altered that trajectory.
He has said he will keep defending himself through legal channels, notably before the State Administrative Court (PTUN). A favorable ruling on the educational credential controversy could let him argue he was unfairly targeted and restore some personal credibility. But a legal victory is not a political revival. Legitimacy is shaped by public perception, collective memory and political narrative, not by courts alone. Even complete vindication would not erase voters’ memories of the controversy over the Constitutional Court decision that enabled his candidacy, or the later disputes over his qualifications.
Indonesia has seen political comebacks, Prabowo’s being a prime example, but they require reinvention, time and a compelling new story. Gibran would be attempting one where the central issue is the legitimacy of his own rise. A serious 2029 candidacy therefore now looks remote.
Ultimately, the larger implications may concern his father. For more than a decade Jokowi dominated Indonesian politics, but influence after leaving office depends on institutions, networks and successors, and all three now appear under pressure. Gibran is leaving the vice presidency, the PSI looks increasingly fragile as a vehicle, elites are reorienting toward Prabowo, and controversies around figures long associated with Jokowi raise questions about his network’s durability.
None of this means Jokowi has ceased to matter. He remains one of Indonesia’s most influential figures and commands substantial public support. But can he shape outcomes without a successor in office? Can the PSI stay relevant without access to power? Can he remain a kingmaker in a landscape increasingly dominated by Prabowo? Those questions remain open. What is clearer is that Gibran’s resignation may be remembered less as the fall of a vice president than as the decisive moment in the transition from the Jokowi era to a fully Prabowo-centered political order.
