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Indonesia’s digital tax: Welcome, but not enough
Tenggara Strategics November 16, 2026
A customer shops on the Tokopedia online market place on his mobile phone on May 4. (Antara/Puspa Perwitasari)
Hashim Djojohadikusumo's recent remarks about tapping the Rp 10,000 trillion shadow economy have renewed attention on the government's efforts to expand digital tax collection. While the measure could generate additional revenue, it is unlikely to address the structural weaknesses underlying Indonesia's fiscal challenges.
The country’s fiscal problems are real. Its tax-to-GDP ratio is low for an economy of its size, and the latest budget figures show that extractive industries account for a substantial share of tax revenue. Compounding the problem is a large informal sector comprising many small businesses whose revenues fall below the tax threshold, as stagnant job creation pushes more people into informal employment.
With a weak labor market, flagging consumer confidence and recent capital outflows, can expanded digital tax collection sustainably fund President Prabowo Subianto's costly signature programs?
Digital tax is not new to Indonesia. It was first introduced in 2020 to narrow the tax gap between conventional and digital businesses and generate additional revenue to support the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The policy introduced value-added tax on intangible goods and services purchased from foreign suppliers through selected digital platforms that were appointed to collect the tax. However, implementation remained incomplete, as the system focused on major platforms while leaving others outside its scope.
Driven by growing fiscal needs to finance major programs, the government introduced the tax collection system for offshore digital transactions (SPP-TDLN) in September after a test period. This was the mechanism Hashim referred to in his remarks about taxing the shadow economy. Under the SPP-TDLN, digital tax collection is shifted to banks and payment service providers.
While the new system could enable the government to capture a larger share of cross-border digital transactions, it would merely be a stopgap measure against fiscal pressures unless a stronger domestic tax base is developed.
Indonesia has missed previous opportunities to develop a strong middle-class tax and consumption base, investing instead in capital-intensive natural resource extraction.
Labor-intensive manufacturing was an important driver of national development after the 1980s oil boom ended, supported by investment and regulatory reforms. However, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis disrupted this trajectory. In the years that followed, Indonesia returned to natural resource-driven growth, benefiting from China's commodity boom while manufacturing's share of economic output steadily declined.
The decline of manufacturing has created a situation in which workers unable to find high-skilled employment are pushed into precarious, low-skilled jobs that limit their prospects. Layoffs during the pandemic and more recent economic difficulties, including the decline of the textile industry, have pushed more Indonesians into the informal work.
Prolonged employment in the informal sector threatens workers' upward economic mobility, as they have fewer opportunities to develop the skills needed to increase their earnings. This in turn constrains the country's long-term tax potential. Meanwhile, the labor market continues to suffer from weak job creation and widespread underemployment.
The country is therefore in a fiscal bind, struggling to build the capacity to withstand unforeseen economic crises, let alone finance the Prabowo administration's signature programs. At 11.8 percent, Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio remains well below the 2024 average of 19.7 percent in the Asia-Pacific as well as the ratios of ASEAN peers like Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Indonesia's fiscal position also worsened in 2024 and 2025 compared with previous years, with wider deficits driven partly by declining revenue as a share of GDP, including from VAT and income tax.
Meanwhile, tax receipts remain volatile because royalties from extractive industries and corporate income taxes from the commodities sector exert considerable influence on government revenue. The latest surge in tax revenue was also driven in part by substantial contributions from the commodities sector.
It is therefore high time for Indonesia to look beyond commodities and diversify its tax base to reduce its vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations.
Strengthening the middle class through policies that promote quality job creation and develop the skills and productivity of the working age population would be a good starting point. Without such efforts, the administration will struggle not only to finance its signature programs but also to weather the economic uncertainties ahead.
