Under Prabowo, non-aligned Indonesia seen shifting away from US

When he took over the helm in October, President Prabowo Subianto was widely expected to reposition Indonesia in the ongoing superpower contest closer to the center. Consistent with its non-alignment foreign policy principle, this would mean Indonesia shifting away from China and closer to the United States.

His predecessor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo brought Indonesia closer to China in the previous 10 years, making the country heavily dependent economically and politically on Beijing. It was Prabowo, the former Army general who served as Jokowi’s defense minister in 2019-2024, who put some restraints by forging closer security ties with the US.

Today, Indonesia has far more defense and security cooperation programs with the US than it has with China, including holding a massive joint military exercise every year. And Indonesia continues to rely on the US to supply most of its weapons. As far as its national security is concerned, China rather than the US is seen as a threat, not only because of its geographical proximity but also because Beijing is starting to exercise its maritime claims in the South China Sea, where the Asian giant has territorial disputes with several Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia.

Three months into his presidency, we have not seen any evidence, or any real effort from Prabowo to shift the balance, raising questions about his intentions or how he plans to address the power rivalry. Even after the Jan. 20 inauguration of Donald Trump as US president, Indonesia will likely struggle to change the perception in the West of its pro-China position.

The good news is that Foreign Minister Sugiono managed to have a phone conversation with new US Secretary of State Marco Rubio the day after Trump’s inauguration. According to the US embassy in Jakarta, and confirmed by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, the two discussed at length the importance of the relationship to their respective national economies and to the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Rubio also encouraged Indonesia to play a role in the Middle East, including in the reconstruction of Gaza following the truce agreement between Israel and Hamas.

Putting all these formalities aside, one issue that is seriously undermining this relationship is the absence of an Indonesian ambassador in Washington, DC, a position that has been left vacant since July 2023. Even since taking power in October, Prabowo has yet to name a candidate for the job. When he does, it will likely take at least six months of confirmation hearing processes before that person can take office.

The absence of an envoy is sending the wrong signal to Washington about how Jakarta treats this relationship, after jointly elevating it to the level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2023.

On the other side of the scale, Indonesia has joined the China-led BRIC, a multilateral economic group set up to challenge the dominance of the US-led G7 in running the global financial system. Prabowo also traveled to China as president-elect and later shortly after his October inauguration to highlight the strategic importance of Beijing. Against the advice of his top diplomats, he agreed to Beijing’s suggestion to start cooperation projects in the contested South China Sea.

Prabowo spoke with Trump on the phone during his trip to Washington in November, only days after the latter won the presidential race. The Indonesian leader reportedly tried to organize another trip to the US for Trump’s inauguration. The plan did not materialize.

Being the center of power of the world’s most powerful country, Washington is a difficult place to work for ambassadors of almost every country.  It is even harder for an envoy from Indonesia, a country that has had little if any strategic economic, political or security importance as far as the US is concerned. Even with the epicenter of global affairs supposedly in Asia in the so-called “Asian Century”, Indonesia and Southeast Asia are not visible in Washington’s lobby corridors.

During his senatorial confirmation hearing for Trump’s defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, was called out when he responded to a question about US policy toward ASEAN by referring to relations with Japan and South Korea. In Washington, when you discuss ASEAN, many people assume that you are talking about Asian pronounced with a funny accent.

But this episode underlines the challenge for ASEAN and Indonesia in Washington. There is better understanding and knowledge of some individual ASEAN countries: The Philippines and Thailand as they are allies of the United States; Singapore because it has been a major trading center; and Vietnam because of the war in the 1970s and the ensuing inflow of refugees.

Indonesia is far less known in the foreign and security communities in Washington. It is never an ally, a concept that Jakarta has vehemently rejected to live up to its non-alignment principle.

Admittedly, Indonesia’s profile in Washington has gradually increased with the country now being described as the world’s fourth most populous nation, the third largest democracy, and the largest democracy among Muslim-majority countries. It is now a trillion-dollar economy, 16th largest in the world and projected by independent analysts to be in the top five in 20 years’ time.

But without an ambassador in place, the Indonesian embassy is severely handicapped in working the political corridors of Washington, in the White House and the congress building.

One advice for Prabowo in selecting a candidate. Don’t follow Jokowi’s habit of sending an ambassador to Washington only to recall him or her because that person was needed back at home. This happened with the last three ambassadors: Mahendra Siregar who lasted six months in 2019, Muhammad Lutfi, three months in 2020, and Rosan Roeslan 18 months until July 2023. The gap, when the position is vacant between these appointments range from 10 to 18 months and a new record even if Prabowo announced the name today.

The longer Prabowo delays sending a new ambassador to Washington, the greater the perception, rightly or wrongly, that Indonesia does not give priority to this relationship and is even taking side in the superpower contest.