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Bid to capture commodity export value faces uncertainty

Tenggara Strategics November 17, 2026 Coordinating Downstream and Energy Transition Minister Bahlil Lahadalia addresses a press briefing on Oct. 16, 2026, at his office in Gambir, Central Jakarta. (Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry /-)

At the opening of Minerba Convex on Nov. 2, Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Bahlil Lahadalia announced restrictions on natural resource exports transiting through intermediary countries to prevent revenue leakages and capture more value from commodity trade. The directive came amid tensions between Indonesia and Singapore, a major regional trading hub, and added another layer of uncertainty following the establishment of Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia (DSI). However, it raises a broader question about whether Indonesia has the infrastructure, financial services and regulatory certainty needed to replace established intermediaries.

The government ambition is understandable knowing that Indonesia has long struggled with revenue losses associated with commodity trade misinvoicing. In the coal sector alone, estimated trade misinvoicing averaged US$2 billion annually between 2015 and 2024, representing a potential source of lost tax revenue, equivalent to 4 percent of total coal exports for 2022, when the value of Indonesian coal exports was at a 5-year high.

Capturing this lost revenue potential is important for Indonesia as the fiscal space is narrowing. Indonesia currently has limited fiscal space to fund its megaprojects such as the free nutritious meal program and Red and White Cooperatives, while the global energy crisis has placed additional pressure on the state budget.

The latest directive also comes amid tensions over Indonesia's natural gas exports to Singapore. Meanwhile, the government has announced plans to redirect some gas supplies toward domestic electricity generation in Sumatra, raising concerns over the future of existing export arrangements. Although Bahlil did not explicitly identify Singapore as the target of the transshipment restriction, its position as a major regional trading hub makes the potential implications particularly significant.

However, eliminating intermediaries does not necessarily mean Indonesia will capture the value they generate. The Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, carrying 23.2 percent of crude oil and petroleum liquids shipment, beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Indonesia's strategic location along this route offers considerable potential to develop international logistics and commodity trading activities.

Yet geographic advantages and resource abundance are insufficient. Despite exporting approximately 527 million tonnes of coal annually, Indonesia has not developed an integrated transshipment network comparable in scale and capability to established international hubs like in Australia or Singapore. Plans to develop a major transshipment port in Dumai, Riau, have yet to materialize.

Furthermore, Singapore provides services that extend beyond physical transshipment, including coal blending to meet international buyers' specifications. With 278 coal mining companies producing coal of varying qualities, Indonesia relies on traders to facilitate transactions and match supply with buyers' requirements. The shipment risk for subsequent legs of the trip would also be borne by Singaporean traders. Cutting off the middleman would return the risk exposure home, and Indonesia has yet to clarify how risk should be allocated in their absence.

Beyond physical infrastructure, Indonesia's financial ecosystem has yet to match Singapore's established capabilities in maritime insurance, trade financing and commodity risk management. Developing these services requires substantial investment, international partnerships and confidence in a stable regulatory environment.

Unfortunately, recent policy developments have raised questions about Indonesia's commitment to regulatory certainty. In the second quarter of 2026, Indonesia established DSI, initially established a centralized export mechanism for strategic commodities, including coal, palm oil and ferroalloy.

The announcement unsettled markets amid concerns over potential export controls, disruptions to existing contracts and the government's expanding role in commodity trading. Indonesia's benchmark stock index fell 3.54 percent following the announcement in May, reflecting broader investor concerns about the proposed arrangement.

DSI scaled back its proposed role, allowing exporters to maintain existing commercial arrangements while introducing verification and intermediary services intended to ensure fair commodity pricing. Nevertheless, Bahlil's latest directive has introduced another layer of uncertainty. His announcement that DSI could become a single gateway for natural resource exports from 2027 adds further questions about how the new system will operate and whether existing commercial arrangements will remain intact.

These developments are particularly concerning because commodity trading depends on long-term contracts, established supply chains and predictable regulations. Sudden policy changes can discourage traders from entering new contracts, increase transaction costs and weaken Indonesia's competitiveness.

Ultimately, eliminating intermediaries cannot be built overnight simply by redirecting shipments. Infrastructure development, financial integration and predictable commercial regulations need to be built to attract the international traders and investor shipping through Indonesia. More importantly, addressing under-invoicing requires stronger customs supervision, transparent pricing and effective tax enforcement. Without credible and consistent trade policies, attempts to retain more export value could undermine investor confidence and reduce the economic benefits Indonesia seeks to secure.

Source: www.thejakartapost.com

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